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This dissertation uses experimental and quasi-experimental methods to evaluate policy 
instruments available to state and local officials administering food assistance programs for 
improving children’s utilization of services, nutritional intake, and food security. More 
specifically, this dissertation consists of three chapters pertaining to the National School Lunch 
Program (NSLP) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). 
In the first chapter, co-authored with Amy Ellen Schwartz, I use large, uniquely detailed 
longitudinal administrative data on New York City students and schools, including the different 
lunch menus they offer over time, to present the first plausibly causal evidence on the link 
between school menus and participation in the NSLP, and their implications for disparities in 
program utilization across students from diverse backgrounds. Using student and school fixed-
effects models, I find that the introduction of new menus increases the share of students 
participating on both the extensive and intensive margins, and can help to close racial, gender, 
and socioeconomic gaps in the utilization of school lunch. In one extension, I find evidence that 
increases in participation are driven by the adoption of newer, more innovative menus. I find no 
evidence of changes in attendance or adverse weight outcomes. These findings provide evidence 
in support of the efforts that many school districts are taking to boost lunch participation by 
reformulating their menus and help to inform the decisions of those considering similar changes.   
While students stand to gain from participating in school lunch, it is also important that 
they make the right dietary choices as they make their way through the lunch line. In the second 
chapter, I use primary data collected through a month-long field and survey experiment I 
designed and conducted to investigate the efficacy of using cheap material rewards to induce 
better dietary choices among low-income Black and Hispanic children—who are more likely to 
be obese than their high-income or white peers—in a school lunch setting. While existing studies 
have shown material rewards to be effective in the short term and when introduced 
intermittently, this study shows that their effect can dissipate quickly over time when offered 
daily. I find no evidence that the introduction of extrinsic incentives crowded out intrinsic dietary 
behaviors. These findings have implications for the design and implementation interventions 
using material rewards for improving dietary habits among school-aged children.  
In the third chapter, I broaden the scope of my research to include SNAP, which helps to 
safeguard the food security of millions of children. The politicization and racialization of the 
program have made it a target of reforms that effectively limit its coverage and efficacy, and 
contribute to its disparate implementation across states and counties in ways that exacerbate 
social inequity. I designed a large survey experiment evaluating the efficacy of highlighting the 
child beneficiaries of SNAP for inducing greater public support for the program. I find that 
emphasizing its child beneficiaries can increase support overall and across key political 
constituencies, though more so when those children are characterized as White than Black. As an 
extension, I also examine the generalizability of these findings to the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families program, and again find that highlighting child beneficiaries leads to increases in 
support, though the estimated effects are less pronounced and even more so dependent on the 
children’s race. These findings can help to inform the outreach efforts of program administrators. 
This dissertation adds to the existing literature by providing new insights and expanding 
on previous work. The results of the first chapter corroborate the many anecdotal accounts 
suggesting that school menus influence student lunch participation, but also show that other 
barriers, such as the price of meals or stigma, may be more important. The second chapter 
extends previous work on using material rewards to induce better dietary behaviors by presenting 
evidence that they may not be as cost-effective or easy to implement as previously thought. The 
findings of the third chapter show that providing information on the child beneficiaries of 
welfare programs can change public attitudes towards them and offer fresh evidence that public 
opinion of government policy is often based on the demographic groups perceived to benefit 
from them. This dissertation also highlights the implications that policy instruments can have for 
social equity and economic equality by focusing on disparities in program utilization, access, and 
outcomes across race, gender, age, and socioeconomic status. Lastly, it offers guidance for policy 
makers and program administrators by providing new evidence about the efficacy of various 
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Students stand to gain a lot from eating school lunch, which has been linked to improved 
nutritional intake, health outcomes, and academic performance (e.g., Gundersen et al., 2012; 
Smith, 2017; Bartfeld, 2015; Hinrichs, 2010; Schwartz & Rothbart, 2019; Lin et al., 2019). 
Schools also stand to benefit as higher student participation can boost test scores and help 
schools avoid potential sanctions under accountability systems (Figlio & Winicki, 2005). 
However, realizing these benefits requires that students participate, yet nearly half of them do not 
(Hoynes & Schanzenbach, 2015). While the nutritional quality of school meals and their cost to 
students has received much attention, little is known about how school menus—the set of meals 
served throughout an academic year—influence participation in school lunch.  
Although the federal government sets nutritional standards for meals served in schools 
participating in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), school districts have considerable 
discretion in setting school food policies, including what to serve their students. School menus 
may therefore constitute an important policy instrument for increasing lunch participation at the 
local level and districts nationwide have taken steps to reformulate their menus in an effort to 
boost participation (Pew and RWJF, 2016; School Nutrition Association, 2017). In addition to 
boosting participation overall, the choice of menus may also help close gaps in lunch 
participation across students from different backgrounds, with potential implications for social 
equity. Yet there is a dearth of rigorous research documenting and exploring student’s 
responsiveness to new menus.  
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This study constitutes the first large-scale investigation of this relationship. Using unique, 
detailed longitudinal student-level data and exploiting variation in the types of menus offered 
across nearly 800 New York City (NYC) traditional public schools, we examine the relationship 
between menus and the propensity for and intensity of lunch participation among middle and 
high school students.1  Specifically, we use student fixed-effects models leveraging variation in 
the types of menus students are exposed to over time while attending the same school together 
with a range of control variables to estimate the impact of a new menu on lunch participation in 
schools with Point of Service (POS) systems tracking lunch transactions. This study is the first to 
make use of school menu data on this scale, and is among the first to make use of POS data—a 
substantial improvement over the survey data on lunch participation used in previous work 
(Moore, Hulsey, & Ponza, 2009). We also document difference in lunch participation across 
students from diverse backgrounds and explore heterogeneous responsiveness to new menus by 
student characteristics. In a series of extensions, we examine the interaction of new menus with 
the introduction of free meals for all students and the relationships between different menu types 
and lunch participation.  Lastly, we assess potential linkages between menus and attendance and 
weight outcomes. This paper focuses on middle and high school students as they are more likely 
to make autonomous decisions about lunch than their elementary school counterparts (Gordon & 
Fox, 2007; Fox & Condon, 2012). 
New York City is an ideal setting for such a study, offering several advantages. First, the 
NYC Department of Education (NYCDOE) is unique in that it offers over a dozen different 
lunch menus that school principals can choose to serve their students, with many schools 
adopting new menus over time, thereby providing the requisite variation for an analysis of menus 
 
1 Propensity for lunch participation and lunch participation intensity can be understood as participation at the 
extensive and intensive margins, respectively. 
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and participation. Second, while implementation of school lunch varies across schools in the 
district, all are subject to uniform nutrition and competitive food policies. Third, the district’s 
large and diverse student population facilitates the exploration of differential responsiveness to 
school menus across students from diverse backgrounds. Fourth, the NYCDOE has diversified 
and expanded its menus in ways similar to other school districts nationwide (e.g., Pew & RWJF, 
2016; Student Nutrition Association, 2016, 2017). The results from this study may therefore help 
to inform other school districts about the efficacy of their own initiatives.  
To preview the results, we find that menus do matter for lunch participation. Overall, 
adopting a new menu may increase the propensity and intensity of students participating by up to 
four and three percentage points, respectively. Relative to baseline participation rates, these 
constitute meaningfully large effects. Responsiveness to new menus also varies considerably by 
student characteristics, suggesting that menus can help close demographic and socioeconomic 
disparities in school lunch participation. The type of menus offered may also matter, as students 
appear to respond more favorably to some than others. Lastly, we find no associations between 
new menus and attendance, and no evidence of adverse effects on weight outcomes.  
Background on the NSLP and Student Lunch Participation 
 
The National School Lunch Act of 1946 established the NSLP to reduce child hunger, 
improve children’s health, and promote the consumption of domestic agricultural commodities. 
The program has since grown to become the second largest food assistance program in the 
United States after the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and provides federally 
subsidized free and low-cost meals to over 30 million children each school day in over 100,000 
schools and childcare centers nationwide at a cost of $14 billion. While all students can 
participate in the program, meals are typically provided using a three tiered system wherein 
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students from households with incomes below 130 percent of the federal poverty line are eligible 
for free lunch, those between 130 and 185 percent eligible for reduced price lunch (no more than 
$0.40), and those over 185 percent paying full price.  
The program has undergone several reforms aimed at expanding its coverage and 
improving the nutritional content of its meals. The most recent was the  Healthy, Hunger-Free 
Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA), which mandated more stringent nutritional standards for school 
meals and beverages, set maximum calorie limits per meal, strengthened weekly requirements 
for fruits and vegetables, and authorized the United States Department of Agriculture to regulate 
the nutritional content of all foods sold in schools.2 Additionally, the act expanded coverage of 
the program through the Community Eligibility Provision, which allows schools to offer free 
meals to all students (known as Universal Free Meals, or UFM).3  
Meals served as part of the NSLP typically meet nutrition standards and are healthier than 
most alternative meals and snacks available to students through vending machines, snack bars, 
fast food outlets, or packed lunches from home (Gordon & Fox, 2007; Fox & Condon, 2012, Au 
et al., 2016; Ralston et al., 2017). Students taking advantage of the program consume more 
protein, essential nutrients, milk, and whole grains as compared to those that do not, and fewer 
desserts, snacks, and other beverages (Bogden, Brizius, & Walker, 2012; Lin et al., 2019). 
Although effects vary across studies depending on the data, population, and methodology used, 
several studies suggest that the NSLP may improve health outcomes and mitigate the prevalence 
 
2 As of February 2019, some of these changes have been reverse. These include the requirement that schools serve 
only whole-grain rich foods and non-flavored milk. The deadline to reduce the amount of sodium in foods served 
was also extended (USDA, 2018). 
3 Schools can offer UFM through the Community Eligibility Provision if at least 40 percent of students are 
categorically eligible for free meals through enrollment in a food or cash assistance program, in the foster care 
system, or homelessness. Food and cash assistance programs by which categorical eligibility is determined includes 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and the Food 
Distribution Program on Indian Reservations. 
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of food insecurity among participating students (Gundersen et al., 2012; Bartfeld, 2015; Smith, 
2017). A growing body of evidence also suggests that participation in the program may boost test 
scores (Figlio & Winicki, 2005; Hinrichs, 2010; Schwartz & Rothbart, 2019), increase 
attendance, and reduce occurrences of disruptive behavior during the school day (Murphy et al., 
1998; Poppendieck, 2010).  
Despite these potential benefits, not all students take advantage of school lunch. In 2014, 
only 56% of all kindergarten through 12th grade students participated, down from a peak of 60% 
in 2010 (Hoynes & Schanzenbach, 2015). While participation is lowest among higher-income 
students, a substantial number from lower-income households also do not participate despite 
eligibility for free or reduced-price lunches. In 2010, only 79% and 73% of students certified 
eligible for a free or reduced-price lunch participated, respectively, and participation was 70% in 
urban areas in 2013, where higher concentrations of poverty might be expected. Participation 
also declines as students age and is particularly low among middle and high school students (Fox 
& Condon, 2012; Carson, 2015).  
Several reasons may explain the low and declining participation rates in the program. 
First, the price of meals may be cost-prohibitive for those not eligible for free or reduced-price 
lunches (Gordon & Fox, 2007; Moore, Hulsey, & Ponza, 2009; Schwartz & Rothbart, 2019). 
Second, stigma may deter participation if eating a school lunch signals a student’s 
socioeconomic status (Mitcheva & Powell, 2009; Poppendieck, 2010). Third, competition from 
foods higher in sugar and fat content sold inside schools but outside of the NSLP (e.g., vending 
machines or a la carte options) and off-site vendors (e.g., fast-food restaurants) may divert 
students away from school meals (Bhatia, Jones, & Reicker, 2011; Miller et al., 2016). Fourth, 
the school environment and related lunch policies—such as cafeteria capacity, time of day lunch 
6 
 
is served, length of the lunch line, and amount of time available for eating—might also deter 
participation (e.g., Smith, Cunningham-Sabo, & Auld, 2015). Lastly, and widely expressed, is 
that the meals served through the program may be unappealing to students, especially as 
increased nutrition standards have made meals healthier (Poppendieck, 2010; Woo Baidal & 
Taveras, 2014).  
While studies have investigated other factors associated with school lunch participation, 
the evidence on whether the menus offered might themselves be a determinant is limited and 
mostly anecdotal. Nevertheless, school districts nationwide are working to enhance the appeal of 
their lunches by reformulating their menus. According to a 2017 survey of over 500 school 
district directors from across the country, 60% reported offering at least one menu item that 
featured an international flavor and 26% were considering or testing such meals. Just over 87% 
reported offering a salad bar, entrée bar, self-service flavor stations, or some other customizable 
menu option (School Nutrition Association, 2017). In another survey, 32% of school directors 
reported increasing menu options in an effort to boost participation and consumption (Pew and 




Existing literature on the relationship between school menus and student lunch 
participation is scarce. Aside from the sensory appeal of the meals offered (e.g., taste and 
aesthetics), the effect of adopting a new menu on student lunch participation is unclear and may 
vary depending on its particular features. Conventional economic theory suggests that menus 
offering more food options are better able to satisfy diverse preferences, leading to increased 
take-up of school lunch. Affording student’s greater choice may also enhance their sense of self-
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autonomy and satisfaction with their chosen option (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010; 
Chernev, Böckenhold, & Goodman; 2015).4 Yet menu variety may still do little to increase 
student participation if the food items offered lack appeal or variety alone is not sufficient to 
overcome other barriers to participation. Studies investigating the link between food variety and 
consumption among children and adolescents are few and present mixed results. In an 
experiment involving Dutch children ages 4 to 6, Zeinstra et al. (2010) found no difference in 
consumption across those given a choice between two vegetables and those who were not offered 
a choice. In contrast, Dominguez et al. (2013) found that Spanish children of the same age who 
were given a choice between two vegetables had a higher rate of consumption than those offered 
no choice. Altintzoglou, et al. (2015) finds that Norwegian 11 and 12-year olds offered a choice 
between two fish meals expressed greater satisfaction with their meal, though consumption was 
no different as compared to the group offered no choice. These studies rely on small convenience 
samples and were conducted under controlled experimental conditions with a limited set of 
options. It is therefore difficult to generalize these results to the cafeteria setting. 
Alternatively, as suggested by consumer theory, the novelty of a new menu might serve 
to increase student participation, though the effect may be short-lived (McAlister and Pessemier, 
1982; Kahn, 1995). However, if students are more comfortable with what they are familiar with, 
the introduction of a new menu may disrupt established behaviors and eating patterns leading to 
a reduction in participation. For example, when asked how students responded to the 
introduction of a healthier menu in 2012, cooks and school food managers from a district in 
 
4 The literature on “choice overload” also suggests that expanding the number of options available might increase 
the cognitive cost of making a choice and induce apprehension, which can deter a decision altogether or leave 
students regretful and unsatisfied. However, the circumstances under which increased choice may become 




Louisiana stated that middle and high school students were disappointed that food items they 
were familiar with were no longer offered and were less likely to participate as a result (Murimi 
et al., 2015). Conversely, a strand of literature examining the relationship between healthier 
school lunches and student participation in the United States found no adverse effects on the 
number of meals served, school revenues, or food waste (Cohen et al., 2014; Cohen et al., 2016; 
Cullen and Dave, 2016; Andersen, Gallagher, and Ritchie, 2018). These findings would suggest 
that students may not respond negatively to changes in school menus. However, these studies fail 
to account for pre-existing trends, use coarse measures of lunch participation, or do not account 
for other changes at the school or district level which could have influenced how students 
responded to new menus.  
Convenience may also matter, as qualitative evidence suggests that students are deterred 
from participating in lunch by long lunch lines (Smith, Cunningham-Sabo, & Auld, 2015). 
Menus allowing students to receive their meals more quickly may therefore encourage 
participation, though the opposite could occur if the kinds of meals that might allow for faster 
access are also unappealing or lack variety.  
This study is the first to investigate the relationship between school menus and lunch 
participation on a large-scale and in the school setting, and controls for a host of unobservable 
and observable student (e.g., innate traits) and school characteristics (e.g., other food policies) 
that might be related to the menus schools choose to serve and lunch participation outcomes. 
Although this study can only link menus to taking a lunch, and not consumption explicitly, it 
constitutes a substantial improvement over existing research and contributes significantly to the 
literature on NSLP participation, particularly as it pertains to the ability of school districts and 
individual schools to influence lunch participation. 
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School Lunch in NYC 
 
 The NYCDOE is the nation’s largest school district, serving over 1.1 million students 
across more than 1,800 traditional and charter public schools. The district’s student body is 
diverse, with Hispanics, Blacks, Asians, and Whites constituting 41, 26, 16, and 15 percent of 
students, respectively. Most students are also economically disadvantaged, with 74 percent 
eligible for a free or reduced-price school lunch.5  
School meal programs in the district are administered by the Office of Food and Nutrition 
Services (OFNS), which operates with a budget of over $550 million, employs over 9,000 
people, and serves nearly one million meals and snacks each school day (Perlman, et al., 2012; 
Hoffman, O’Hagan, K., & Sompura, 2018).6 Beginning in 2001, NYCDOE implemented a series 
of reforms to make its school meals healthier and develop new recipes. As a result, nutrition 
standards for school lunches in New York City meet or exceed those required under federal 
guidelines. The district has also expanded free meal coverage, notably in academic year 2014, 
when it made free lunch available to all reduced price eligible students while raising the cost of a 
full price lunch to $1.75 (from $1.50), and in academic years 2015 and 2018, when it introduced 
UFM to schools serving grades 6 through 8 and then all schools, respectively.7 
The NYCDOE also took steps beginning in 2003 to restrict competitive foods in school 
by eliminating all sodas from vending machines and permitting only water, milk, 100% juice, 
and low-fat snacks. These efforts were reinforced in 2008 when the city government imposed 
additional nutrition restrictions for all foods offered in city agencies, including schools.8 This 
 
5 New York City Department of Education, accessed May 2019: https://on.nyc.gov/2K0hklV 
6 Meals served includes breakfast, lunch, snacks, and after school meals. 
7 Prior to the HHFKA, schools in NYC provided free meals to students at certain schools under Provision 2 of the 
National School Lunch Act. See Schwartz and Rothbart (2019) for details. 




was followed by additional NYCDOE nutrition restrictions in 2010 for all competitive foods 
offered in schools, including fundraisers, bake-sales, a la carte options, and vending machines 
(Perlman, et al., 2012). Efforts to regulate competitive foods in schools, such as those taken by 
the NYCDOE, have been shown to be associated with lower access to less healthy alternatives to 
school provided meals (Merlo et al., 2014). 
In 2004, OFNS hired chefs to develop menu items more appealing to students and which 
could be prepared in all schools, regardless of kitchen space and equipment (Perlman et al., 
2012).9  Reflecting these goals, OFNS began making available additional lunch menus—each 
consisting of a set of meals provided daily based on a service schedule—that schools could serve 
starting in 2009 and greatly expanded their choice set beginning in 2012, as shown in Figure 1. 
As of 2019, OFNS boasts more than 130 recipes offered across 13 lunch menus.  
 These menus vary by number of food items (entrées and salads), type of food items (e.g., 
hot vs. cold), their delivery method (e.g., express or service line), and their preparation (e.g., 
“scratch-cooked” or off-site) and can be organized broadly into two categories, standard and 
non-standard, that include menus reflecting nationwide trends in changes to school lunch menus. 
The set of standard menus are those most often served by middle and high schools and include 
more food items and variety (e.g. hot and cold food items as well as culturally diverse meals) as 
compared to most other menus. The set of non-standard menus includes the alternative, express, 
special needs, early childhood, vegetarian, and food court menus. The set of alternative menus 
includes more scratch-cooked meals prepared on-site using raw ingredients and fewer processed 
 
9 Appealing to the tastes of its diverse student body is a primary concern. As stated on the OFNS website, the 
department invests a “considerable amount of time in…reformulating food items to guarantee…citywide menus that 
are specific to the various school divisions…and meet the needs of our students,” and “…to guarantee that the 




foods. Express “grab and go” menus offer fewer food items and less variety, and either serve hot 
(e.g., burgers) or cold (e.g., deli sandwiches) foods. Special needs menus offer a subset of the 
meals offered in the standard menus, as does the early childhood menu, which includes fewer 
culturally diverse meals and no pizza. The vegetarian menu serves meals without meat protein. 
Lastly, the food court menu offers the greatest variety of foods—with daily offerings of 
sandwiches, salads, pizzas, French fries, and popcorn chicken in addition to options from the HS 
standard menu—in cafeterias designed to mimic a food court-style environment.10 Among the set 
of standard menus are the high school (HS), middle school (MS), and Kindergarten through 
eighth grade (K-8) standard menus. Alternative menus include both a HS and K-8 version, as do 
the express cold, express hot, and special needs menus.  
While there is overlap in the entrees and salads that appear across menus, there are food 
items that appear in some but not others. For example, as seen in Figure 2, the HS standard 
menu offers 108 food items while the middle school (MS) menu offers 94, of which 87 are 
included in the former but seven are not (e.g., “oven roasted turkey & cheese hero”).11 
 Another source of variation across menus is their food item service schedule. To illustrate 
this point, panel A of Figure 3 depicts what is served as part of the HS standard menu in a 
typical week. As with most menus, students are offered an entrée, salad, and a side each day. 
Panel B then compares what is served as part of the HS standard menu with that in the HS 
alternative menu for the same week in the same academic year. Each day, entrées, salads, or both 
differ across the two menus. On Monday, students in schools offering the HS standard menu 
 
10 Some food items served as part of the food court menu are displayed as hot or cold options under heat lamps or in 
refrigerated display cases, which allows students to self-select meals. In some cases, this menu was accompanied by 
changes to the dining area, such as new seating arrangements (e.g., booths and round tables instead of rectangular 
tables) or renovations of the floors, walls, and lighting of the cafeteria. 
11 Officials at OFNS affirmed that contents of menus were relatively stable between school years 2013-2014 and 
2017-2018, after which there have been substantial changes, such as the discontinued use of processed meats in 
school meals beginning in the 2019-2020 school year. 
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were offered a “celery and apple salad” while those serving the HS alternative menu were 
offered the “Asian slaw salad.” However, on some days, like Tuesday, the same food item 
appears across both menus—in this case the “turkey cheeseburger.” As seen in Figure 4, the 
number of food items available on any given day may also vary, with the standard set of menus 
offering more options as compared to most non-standard menus. 
School principals decide which menus to serve their students. Although nutritional 
standards and menus are set by OFNS and apply to all schools, principals have substantial 
discretion over their school’s food policies. School principals decide what (e.g. cafeteria-based 
programs), when (e.g., time of day), and who (e.g., grade levels) to serve. They also decide 
whether their students can leave school during lunch and if snack and junk foods are permissible 
on school grounds and where and when they can be eaten (Leardo et al., 2018). According to 
OFNS, school principals typically choose which menu to serve early in the academic year.12   
 These features of the NYC school district—the variation in menus across and within 
schools over time in a single district with uniform nutrition and competitive food policies—
together with its size and diversity make it an ideal setting to study the link between menus and 
lunch participation on a large scale and the efficacy of introducing new menus as a policy 
instrument. Insights gleaned from NYC can guide other districts and school administrators 
considering introducing new menus and better inform those already doing so. 
Data and Measures 
 
This study uses unique, richly detailed longitudinal data on NYC students and schools for 
academic years 2013-2014 (AY 2014) to 2017-2018 (AY 2018) provided by the NYCDOE and 
 
12 According to officials at OFNS, principals can choose which menus to serve for any reason, including personal 
preference, though practical considerations such as staff workload, kitchen capacity, equipment, and student’s tastes 
play a significant role. 
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OFNS.  Specifically, we focus on students in schools with point-of-service (POS) systems 
tracking meal transactions to facilitate the construction of our lunch participation measures.13 
Student characteristics include race/ethnicity, gender, participation in special education 
services, primary language spoken at home, certified eligibility for free or reduced priced lunch, 
daily attendance, school attended, and, for a large subset of students, weight, height, and daily 
breakfast and lunch transactions. We create two measures of lunch participation. The first is an 
“ever participate in lunch” (EverLP1) binary variable that reflects the propensity for lunch 
participation and takes a value of 1 if a student has at least one lunch transaction in an AY and 0 
otherwise. We further supplement this with binary variables capturing at least 10 (EverLP10) and 
twenty (EverLP20) transactions in an AY. The annual “lunch participation rate” (LPrate) variable 
captures lunch participation intensity and is measured as the percent of days a student 
participated in school lunch of all days they attended school. It is constructed by dividing the 
number of lunch transactions a student had in an AY by the number of days they attended school 
in that same year and multiplying by 100. We create measures for participation in school 
breakfast similarly (EverBP1, EverBP10, EverBP20, and BPrate). 
Student race/ethnicity is captured by a set of binary variables that take a value of 1 if a 
student is Asian or Other (e.g., Native American or Pacific Islander), Hispanic, Black, or White, 
and 0 otherwise. Gender, participation in special education services, and primary language 
spoken at home are measured as binary variables that take values of 1 if a student is female 
(Female), has an individualized education program (SWD), or speaks a primary language other 
than English at home (Non-English at Home), and 0 otherwise. The free and reduced-price lunch 
(FRPL) measure is time-invariant and takes a value of 1 if a student was certified eligible for a 
 
13 Point-of-service systems require that students input an identification number as they receive their school meals, 
thereby creating a record of their lunch transaction. 
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free or reduced-price lunch in any year between 2001 and 2018 (Ever FRPL) and 0 otherwise.14 
Annual student attendance is measured as the number of days present divided by the total 
number of school days multiplied by 100. Data on schools attended is used to construct a binary 
variable that takes a value of 1 if a student attends a different school than in the previous year 
(New School), and 0 otherwise.15 Data on student weight and height is used to calculate student’s 
Body Mass Index (BMI). Weight variables include BMI measured as z-scores and normalized by 
grade-year (zBMI), the natural logarithm of BMI (ln(BMI)), and indicator variables for 
underweight (BMI percentile ≤ 5th), overweight (85th < BMI percentile ≤ 95th), or obese (95th < 
BMI percentile),  and 0 otherwise, based on age- and sex-specific growth charts from the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention.  
 School characteristics include the number of students enrolled at the school (Enrollment), 
the school’s principal, UFM status, and menu served.16 To proxy for principal decisions that may 
influence lunch participation, a binary variable that takes a value of 1 the year a school gets a 
new principal and 0 otherwise is included (New Principal). School UFM status is measured by a 
binary variable that takes a value of 1 the years a school provides all students with free meals and 
0 otherwise (UFM). We create a variable for years a school does not provide all students with 
free meals similarly (No UFM). 
 
14 This measure better captures the economic disadvantage faced by some students in NYC and protects against 
potential under-reporting of individual eligibility for meal subsidies among students in UFM schools whose 
eligibility status cannot be determine through direct certification (i.e., by enrollment in another means tested 
program) or whose households may no longer submit forms used to determine eligibility status. See Schwartz and 
Rothbart (2019) for additional details. 
15 In our main analysis, we use a sample of students that do not change schools and for whom variation in exposure 
to new menus is due to their schools choosing to adopt a new menu. As a robustness check, we also run the analysis 
including students who change schools and for whom variation in exposure to a new menu may be due to their 
schools adopting a new menu or them attending a new school that serves a menu that differs from their previous 
schools. We elaborate on this further below. 
16 We have menu data as of December 31st for AY 2014, and October 31st for each subsequent year. According to 
officials at OFNS, most schools have selected their menus by October and rarely make changes thereafter, but if a 
school not identified as having introduced a new menu in a particular year actually did so then our estimates will be 
biased downwards. We use student and school identifiers to match students to menus. 
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Our key variables capture the relationship between school menus and lunch participation. 
A binary variable Post New Menu measures the overall effect of adopting a new menu and takes 
a value of 1 in the year a student is exposed to a menu that differs from what they were served 
the previous year and each year thereafter, and 0 otherwise. For example, if a student was served 
the HS standard menu in AY 2014 and the HS alternative menu in AY 2015-2017, Post New 
Menu would take a value of 0 in the former and a value 1 one for each of the years in the latter 
period. To allow the effect of a new menu to vary over time, we create binary variables Post New 
Menu 1st AY and Post New Menu gt. 1 AY  (where “gt.” Denotes “greater than”) that take a value 
of 1 in the first year of a new menu and two, three, or four years after, respectively, and 0 
otherwise. Using the previous example, Post New Menu 1st AY would take a value of 1 in AY 
2015 and 0 in both AY2016 and 2017, while Post New Menu gt. 1 AY would take a value of 0 in 
AY 2015 and 1 in each of AY2016 and 2017.  
As an extension to our main analysis, we create four other measures. The first two are a 
binary variables Non-Standard Menu and Standard Menu that take a value of 1 if a student is 
served any one of the non-standard (for the former) or standard (for the latter) menus, and 0 
otherwise. The other two variables are an interaction of Post New Menu with Non-Standard 
Menu and Standard Menu, and capture the effect of a new non-standard or standard menu. 
Lastly, to investigate differential responsiveness by the type of menu offered, we create a set of 
indicator variables for each menu that appears in our analytic samples. These variables capture 
whether a student is served an alternative menu, express menu, food court menu, K-8 standard 







 The analytic “stable school” sample includes students in grades 6 through 12 attending 
traditional public schools with POS systems serving a single menu and excludes students in 
charter and special education schools, and those who change schools.17,18 To leverage the 
longitudinal nature of the data, students must also be observed in at least two years. An 
alternative “Full” sample includes students who change schools between academic years during 
the sample period.19 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics pooled across AY 2014-2018, beginning with those 
for all NYC middle and high school students in traditional public schools in column 1, those not 
included in the stable school and full samples in columns 3 and 6, and for the stable school and 
full samples in columns 2 and 5.  The stable school sample includes roughly 330,000 unique 
students across 787 schools and 890,000 student-year observations. Reflecting the diversity of 
the district, the stable school sample is majority-minority and nearly half of all students speak a 
primary language other than English at home. Almost all students have been certified eligible for 
a free or reduced-price lunch at least once. The full sample is similar to both the stable school 
sample and the population of all students and includes roughly 480,000 unique students across 
885 schools and over 1.4 million student-year observations. Neither the students in the stable 
school sample nor the full sample are meaningfully different from their excluded counterparts, as 
shown in columns 4 and 7. For each of the two samples, Table 2 presents descriptive statistics 
 
17 Appendix Table A1 depicts the distribution of schools serving middle and high school students with POS systems 
across the sample period. Point-of-service systems were introduced in the mid-2000’s and the number of schools 
adopting them has readily increased since. Students in schools with POS systems are not, however, qualitatively 
different than those in non-POS schools on observable characteristics, as seen in columns 2 and 3 of Appendix 
Table A2, nor are they substantively different from the general population of students. 
18 To be included in the sample, observations must also have valid attendance (non-missing or non-zero) so that 
lunch participation measures can be constructed, but this condition only drops a very small fraction (<0.01%). 
19 This sample still excludes students who switch schools within an AY since the precise timing of a school switch 
cannot be determined. Less than 1% of the sample switches schools within an academic year. 
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for students who are ever and never exposed to a new menu. The characteristics shown in 
columns 3 and 6 do not reveal any meaningful differences across the two types of students in 
either sample.  
Table 3 shows the variation in the two samples. The average student is observed roughly 
three times in both samples. Either by switching schools or their school deciding to make 
changes between academic years, 33 percent of the full sample and 7 percent of the stable school 
sample experience at least one new menu, while about a third of students in both samples get a 
new principal. As seen in Table 4, there is substantial variation in the types of menus served 
across and within schools over time in the stable school sample between AY 2015 and AY 2018.   
 Turning again to Table 2, roughly 87 percent of students in the stable school sample 
participate in lunch at least once, 72 percent at least 10 times, and 65 percent at least 20 times in 
an AY across the sample period. The average lunch participation rate across all years is 40 
percent, though there is substantial heterogeneity across students from different backgrounds, as 
shown in Figure 5 for AY 2017. As seen in Panel A, Asian or Other students are most likely to 
participate in school lunch, followed by Hispanic, Black, and White students. Lunch 
participation is about 10 percentage points higher among students who primarily speak a 
language other than English at home as compared to those who speak English at home.20 Male 
students are eight percentage-points more likely to participate in school lunch as compared to 
females. Students never certified eligible for a free or reduced-price lunch have the lowest 
participation rate at 20 percent. Lunch participation also declines as students age—from over 50 
 
20 The relatively higher lunch participation rates for Asians/Other students in New York, as compared to nationally, 
may be related to their nativity status, as students from immigrant backgrounds may be more likely to participate in 
school lunch. While we do not know students’ place of birth, we proxy for this using primary language spoken at 
home. Among Asian/Other students, 68% primarily speak a language other than English at home. This figure is also 
high among Hispanic students at 64%, but low for Black and White students, at 10% and 34%, respectively. Among 
Asian/Other, Hispanic, Black, and White students who primarily speak English at home, lunch participation rates are 
37%, 40%, 38%, and 25%, respectively. 
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percent in grade six to under 30 percent in grade 12—with a steep drop-off between grades eight 




The centerpiece of our empirical work is a student fixed-effects model linking lunch 
participation to new menus as follows: 
(1) Participationist = β0 + β1Post New Menuist + β2Xist + β3Zst + δg + λt + αi +  εi,s,t 
where subscripts i, s, and t represent student, school, and academic year, respectively. When 
investigating the association between a new menu and propensity for lunch participation (i.e., 
likelihood of participating in lunch), the outcome—Participationist—is EverLP. For lunch 
participation intensity (i.e., frequency of lunch participation), the outcome of interest is LPrate. 
Post New Menuist captures the overall effect of a new menu.  Xist and Zst are vectors of time-
varying student and school characteristics including primary language spoken at home and 
participation in special education services, and UFM status, total enrollment, and new principal, 
respectively. Grade, year, and student fixed-effects are represented by δg, λt, and αi, respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered by school as decisions regarding menus are made at the school level 
and students are clustered in schools.21 To estimate the effect of a new menu over time, we 
estimate the same model substituting Post New Menu 1st AY and Post New Menu gt. 1 AYist for 
Post New Menuist.  
 We estimate this model on the stable school sample, which also controls for time-
invariant school characteristics since students in this sample do not change schools. Estimated 
coefficients will capture causal effects if school adoptions of new menus are unrelated to student 
 
21 We make these clustering choices following Cameron and Miller (2015). 
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characteristics and if there are no other concurrent changes in school policies, practices, and 
characteristics that might affect lunch participation rates. The student fixed-effects serve to 
control for unobserved student and school specific time-invariant factors that might influence 
their participation in lunch.22 The addition of controls help to account or proxy for important 
time varying factors, such as changes in the price of school lunch, cafeteria capacity, and 
changes in lunch policies. Grade fixed-effects help to control for factors common to all students 
in a particular grade that may influence lunch participation (e.g., taste preferences at a particular 
age) while year fixed-effects help to control for shocks that affect all students in a particular year 
(e.g., food fads). We show evidence to support the assumption that the adoption of new menus is 
unrelated to school characteristics below.  
We do not include weight controls in our primary specification to avoid dropping 
observations, as we do not have data for roughly 20% of the students in both our full and stable 
school samples.23 As a robustness check, we estimate a model including controls for whether a 
student is underweight, overweight, or obese. Additionally, we also estimate the baseline model 
on the more inclusive full sample of students, which includes students who change schools 
between academic years. For this analysis, we amend the specification above to include school 
fixed-effects and a control for school changes.24,25 
 
 
22 At the student level, these characteristics may include intrinsic motivation for seeking out substitutes for school 
meals or family background. At the school level, these may include the social setting, time of day lunch is served 
and how long students are given to eat, or whether school faculty and staff spend time in the cafeteria and eat with 
students, among other lunch practices. 
23 Dropping these observations also eliminates much of the variation in new menus. In the stable school sample, we 
lose 15% of students exposed to a new menu. 
24 As another robustness check, we substitute school fixed-effects for student fixed-effects in the baseline model. In 
these specifications, the vector of control variables also includes student race and ethnicity, gender, and FRPL 
status. 
25 As a falsification test, we also estimate the baseline model substituting lunch participation outcomes with 





 The differences in lunch participation rates across students documented above also 
suggests that the relationship between new menus and lunch participation may vary across race 
and ethnicity, gender, economic status, and grade. Some menus may, for example, better cater to 
the taste preferences of particular demographics by offering healthier or more culturally diverse 
meals. It may also be that older or higher-income students with greater access to school lunch 
alternatives may react differently to menus that offer greater daily variety as compared to their 
younger or lower-income peers. We explore differential responsiveness to new menus by 
estimating the baseline model separately for each set of characteristics and interacting Post New 
Menu with each characteristic as follows: 
(2) Participationist = β0 + β1Post New Menuist*Student Characteristicsist + β2Xist + β3Zst + δg + λt 
+ αi +  εi,s,t 
The specifications for race and ethnicity include interactions for Asian/Other, Hispanic, Black 
and White. The specification for gender includes interactions with binary variables for male and 
female. The specification for FRPL status includes interactions with binary variables for never 
FRPL and ever FRPL. Lastly, the specification for grade includes interactions with binary 
variables for students in middle and high school.  
Exploring Moderating Factors, Mechanisms, and Indirect Effects 
 
As an extension to our main analysis, we explore complementarities between the 
introduction of new menus and UFM, which not only eliminates prices but may also reduce the 
stigma associated with school lunch (Schwartz & Rothbart, 2019). If the cost of meals or stigma 
associated with school lunch constitute major barriers to participation, then students may be most 
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responsive to new menus in schools that have adopted UFM. To examine this, we estimate the 
following model: 
(3) Participationist = β0 + β1Post New Menuist*UFMist + β2Post New Menuist*No UFMist + β3Xist + 
β4Zst + δg + λt + αi + εi,s,t 
We also explore potential mechanisms by examining the relationship between specific 
menu types and lunch participation. We do this in two ways. First, we assess the extent to which 
the adoption of non-standard menus drive the relationship between new menus and participation. 
While the standard menus offer a greater number of food items and more variety than most of the 
non-standard menus, the latter have unique features that might make them more or less appealing 
to students. We do this as follows: 
(3) Participationist = β0 + β1Non-Standard Menuist + β2Post New Menuist*Standard Menuist + 
β3Post New Menuist*Non-Standard Menuist + β4Xist + β5Zst + δg + λt + αi +  εi,s,t 
Second, we estimate models relating specific menu types to participation using indicator 
variables for HS standard, MS standard, K-8 standard, alternative, express, and food court 
menus. 
 For our final extension, we examine potential linkages between new menus and 
attendance and weight outcomes by substituting lunch participation outcomes in the baseline 
model with measures of attendance and weight. 
Main Results 
New Menus and Lunch Participation 
 
 Regression results for the relationship between new menus and the propensity for lunch 
participation (EverLP) are shown in columns 1 through 3 of Table 5. As seen in panel A, the 
adoption of a new menu is associated with a 3-percentage point increase in the likelihood of a 
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student participating in school lunch at least once and a 4-percentage point increase for 
participating at least 10 times. The estimated effect for the likelihood of participating at least 20 
times is positive and similar in magnitude though statistically insignificant. Panel B presents 
estimates for the effect of a new menu over time. The first year of a new menu is associated with 
an increase in the likelihood of participating at least once, 10 times, and 20 times in an AY by 
2.7, 4.1, and 3.4 percentage points. These effects may persist in later years as the likelihood of 
participating at least once is often larger in the years after adoption. Column 4 presents the 
results for lunch participation intensity (LPrate). The adoption of a new menu is associated with 
a 2.5 percentage point increase in lunch participation rates overall. As seen in panel B, the effect 
is concentrated in the first year of an adoption, when lunch participation rates increase by 2.6 
percentage points on average.  
These estimates are meaningfully large, constituting a 4 to 6 percent increase in the share 
of students participating in school lunch at least once and ten times in an academic year relative 
to baseline rates of 85 and 71 percent. The estimates are similarly large for lunch participation 
rates, translating to a 6.5 percent increase in lunch participation rates among all students in the 
sample. Together, these results suggest that the introduction of a new menu increases the 
propensity for and intensity of lunch participation. Although imprecisely estimated, the analysis 
of the effect of new menus over time suggests that their effect may persist over time, implying 
that specific features of menus may be important and that novelty may not be the sole 
mechanism involved. 
Differential Responsiveness to New Menus Across Students 
 
Figure 6 present the results for the propensity and intensity of participation by student 
race and ethnicity, gender, FRPL status, and grade. The adoption of new menus is associated 
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with increases in the propensity for participation by 3.2 percentage points among Black students 
and 8.6 percentage points among White students, while estimates for the participation of Asian 
and Hispanic students are smaller and statistically insignificant. The associated increase in the 
propensity for participation among females is 4.3 percentage points, twice that of males, and 14 
percentage points among never FRPL students, seven times that of students ever certified for 
FRPL. New menus seem to have no differential effect on middle school students but increase the 
propensity for participation among high school students by 5.5 percentage points.26  
Turning to lunch participation intensity, the results show increases of 4 and 5 percentage 
points among Black and White students, respectively. Lunch participation rates also increase by 
about 3 percentage points for male and high school students. As before, the largest effects are 
observed among never FRPL students, whose lunch participation rates increase by 7.5 
percentage points. To put these estimates into perspective, the effect of a new menu on 
participation intensity for White and never FRPL students is roughly half to two-thirds the size 
of the effect that UFM has been found to have on lunch participation rates among “non-poor” 
students (11 percentage points) and on par with or larger than the effect on “poor” students (5.4 
percentage points) (Schwartz & Rothbart, 2019). These substantial increases suggest that these 
students may be better served when their schools introduce new menus.27   
Furthermore, participation in school lunch has been found to be higher among those 
eligible for free or reduced price meals relative to those not, younger students, and, in other 
contexts, Hispanics and Blacks relative to Whites and Asians (Dunifon and Kowaleski-Jones, 
2003; Newman & Ralston, 2006; Gordon & Fox, 2007; Fox & Condon, 2012). Given the 
 
26 We find similar results when using EverLP10 and EverLP20 as dependent variables. Results available upon request. 
27 Regression results presented in Appendix Table A14. We also run the analysis on the full sample. Results are 
largely consistent and shown in Appendix Table A15. 
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benefits that school lunch may have for student health and academic outcomes, heterogeneity in 
lunch participation could have substantial implications for disparities in the growth and 
development of children and adolescents from different backgrounds. The results therefore also 
suggest that offering new menus, perhaps those satisfying a broader range of tastes, could be one 
way that school districts can close racial and socioeconomic gaps in lunch participation and, 
potentially, disparities in academic and health outcomes.  
Extensions 
Responsiveness to New Menus in UFM Schools 
 
 Table 6 presents the results for the relationship between new menus, UFM, and lunch 
participation. The introduction of UFM has a large and statistically significant positive effect on 
lunch participation, increasing the propensity for participating by 8 to 9 percentage points and 
the intensity of participation by about 4.5 percentage points. The estimated coefficients for the 
effect of a new menu in schools without UFM across the different lunch participation measures 
are positive but statistically insignificant and qualitatively smaller than their counterparts for 
schools offering free meals to all students, wherein the introduction of a new menu  increases the 
propensity for participation by 4 to 5 percentage points and the intensity of participation by 
roughly 3 percentage points. One implication may be that the introduction of free meals could 
make students more responsive to trying new foods, either by eliminating prices, reducing 
stigma, or both. However, the two sets of coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from 
one another and so effects of new menus in non-UFM schools cannot be ruled out.28 
 
 
28 We also run the analysis on the full sample. The results remain consistent and are shown in Appendix Table A16. 
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Relationship between Specific Menu Types and Lunch Participation 
 
 We explore potential mechanisms underlying the link between new menus and lunch 
participation by exploring how the relationship varies across the different types of menus 
offered. We start by examining whether the adoption of new non-standard menus drives our 
main results. The results in Table 7 suggest that much of the relationship between new menus 
and lunch participation may be driven by the adoption of new non-standard menus, which is 
associated with a 6 to 7 percentage point increase in the propensity for participating and a 6.4 
percentage point increase in the intensity of participation. The null hypothesis of equality for the 
coefficients on the two interaction terms are rejected at conventional significance levels for the 
measures of participating at least one and 10 times in a school year. The estimates for 
participating at least 20 times and lunch participate rates are not, however, statistically different 
from their counterparts for the introduction of a new standard menu, which are positive but 
statistically insignificant and qualitatively smaller.29  
Figure 7 shows the results further disaggregating menus by specific types.30 Relative to 
the HS Standard menu, the most common menu served across schools in the analytic samples, 
the food court menu is associated with large increases both in the propensity and intensity of 
participation. This might be expected as the food court menu offers several likely quite popular 
options (e.g., pizza and popcorn chicken) daily in addition to what is served as part of the HS 
standard menu, which indicates that either the type of meals offered, variety, or both are 
important factors for inducing greater lunch participation. Furthermore, the food court menu’s 
 
29 Testing the null hypothesis of equality for the coefficients on the two interaction terms produces p-values of 0.08 
for EverLP1, 0.02 for EverLP10, 0.16 for EverLP20, and 0.10 for LPrate, respectively. We also ran the analysis on the 
full sample and find similar results, as shown in Appendix Table A17. 
30 Regression results presented in Appendix Table A18. 
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self-service feature might also add to the appeal of school lunch by providing students with a 
greater sense of autonomy and reducing wait times in lines. In schools that also underwent 
renovations, changes to the cafeteria environment may have also mattered. 
Though imprecisely estimated, the magnitude and direction of the coefficients for the 
express menus across all measures of participation likely rule out the potential for any positive 
effects from these menus. While “grab and go” options may reduce wait times for lunch in the 
cafeteria, these menus offer a limited set of options comprised mostly of hot and cold sandwiches 
or salads that may be, or become over time, unappealing to many students. Similarly, though 
imprecisely estimated, alternative menus serving more scratch-cooked and less processed foods 
may increase the propensity for participation. Together, these results suggest that the type of 
meals served and how they’re prepared may also matter. 
Consequences for Other Outcomes 
 
 In addition to lunch participation, new menus may also have notable indirect effects. 
Offering a new menu may entice students to attend school more regularly so as to take advantage 
of school lunch. Of particular concern, lunch participation induced by the introduction of new 
menus may have consequences for weight outcomes through consumption of school meals. 
Table 8 presents the results for the relationship between new menus, attendance, and weight. 
The introduction of a new menu is not associated with changes in attendance rates. Importantly, 
new menus are also unrelated to worse weight outcomes.31 These results are consistent with those 
 
31 It is worth noting that height and weight measurements are captured in the first three months of fall for roughly 
half of students. As such, the results for the weight outcomes may reflect only short run associations. Results were 
consistent when restricting the analysis to students whose weight and height data was collected in the months after 
December. Results available upon request. We also run the analysis on the full sample and find similar results, as 
shown in Appendix Table A19. 
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of Schwartz and Rothbart (2019), which found the introduction of UFM to have no effect on 
attendance and no evidence of adverse effects for weight outcomes. 
Probing the Main Results 
Robustness Checks 
 
We test the robustness of the main results in four ways. First, we explore the sensitivity 
of our findings to sample composition. To assess the generalizability of our findings to a larger 
population of students, we expand the sample to include those who change schools between 
academic years and re-estimate the student fixed-effects models above. In this more inclusive 
sample, the effect of a new menu is identified by variation in exposure to new menus within 
students over time due both to their schools adopting new menus and students changing schools 
between academic years.  As seen in Table A3 of the Appendix, the results are similar. To 
further test the sensitivity of our results to sample composition, we restrict the stable school 
sample to those students who ever experience a new menu. If students who are ever exposed to a 
new menu differ from those who are not, our initial impact estimates may be spurious. As shown 
in Table A4, the estimates for this smaller sample are unsurprisingly less precise but remain 
positive. As a last check, we restrict the stable school and full samples to students with a history 
of lunch participation—defined as having participated in school lunch at least once in period t-
1—and rerun the analysis for lunch participation intensity, again finding similar results as seen in 
Table A5. 
Second, we employ school fixed-effects instead of student fixed-effects. While the 
student fixed-effects models estimated above rely on variation in exposure to new menus within 
students over time, school fixed effects models are identified based on new menu adoptions 
within schools over time.  In the stable school sample, 3,904 students are first observed the year 
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their school adopts a new menu, but do not experience a new menu thereafter. In the school 
fixed-effects models using the stable school sample, these students are now treated as being 
exposed to a new menu. The results are shown in Table A6 and remain consistent though 
estimated with less precision. We repeat this exercise for schools in the full sample, treating 
students as exposed to a new menu if the school they are attending adopts a new menu, and find 
similar results as seen in Table A7.  
Third, we include weight control variables for whether a student is underweight, or 
overweight or obese. Table A8 presents the results. Although the sample changes due to missing 
data for roughly a fifth of students, the results remain consistent. Lastly, to determine whether 
our key findings are driven by cafeteria renovations rather than adoption of new menus, we 
restrict the stable school sample to exclude exposure to the food court menu, which was 
sometimes coupled with changes to the food environment. Although we lose substantial variation 
in this smaller sample, the results, presented in Table A9, remain consistent with our key 
findings, though the effect on lunch participate intensity is smaller and statistically insignificant. 
The robustness of our results to alternative samples, identifying assumptions, and model 
specifications lend support to a causal interpretation of our impact estimates.  
Do Observables Predict New Menus? 
 
 A causal interpretation of our main impact estimates requires the identifying assumption 
that new menu adoptions at the school level are unrelated to student characteristics and lunch 
participation. To test the plausibility of this assumption, models with school-fixed effects are 
estimated using time-varying school level characteristics in period t to predict the adoption of a 
new menu in period t+1:  
New Menu,s,t+1 = β0 + θStudent Compositions,t + λYeart  + αs + εs,t 
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Where “Student Composition” variables are school level aggregates of the student variables 
defined above. We do this for all schools in the stable school sample and those with no new 
menu adoption in period t.32 Qualitatively small and statistically insignificant estimates would 
provide support for a causal interpretation of our main results.  
 The regression results at the school level for the adoption of a new menu are presented in 
Appendix Table A10. The estimates are qualitatively small across both specifications, 
particularly the coefficients on the measures for EverLP and LPrate, which are near zero. The F-
statistics for the joint significance of the time-varying variables are also small.  
 It may also be problematic if particular types of students are more or less likely to be 
exposed to a new menu, as that might suggest selection into schools. Parents are unlikely to 
know in advance of the academic year if principals will decide to introduce a new menu or to 
prioritize school meals—among all school characteristics—when choosing schools for their 
children.   Nevertheless, we examine whether student characteristics can predict exposure to a 
new menu by repeating the above test at the student level. The results are shown in appendix 
Table A11. Again, the estimates are close to zero and mostly statistically insignificant, with low 
F-statistics.33   
 
32 We also run models including variables for percent of students in each of grades 7 through 12, enrollment, linear 
and quadratic terms for principal tenure, adoption of UFM in period t+1, and new principal in period t+1. Estimates 
in these models remain qualitatively small and statistically insignificant with low F-statistics for joint significance. 
Additionally, we perform this test restricting the analysis to only those schools that ever adopt new menus. Though 
the coefficients in this smaller sample are less precisely estimated and thus statistically insignificant, they remain 
qualitatively small. Results available upon request. 
33 We run the student level analysis including indicator variables for underweight, overweight, and obese. Results 
remain qualitatively small and statistically insignificant with low F-statistics for joint significance. We also run the 
analysis restricting the stable school sample to students who are ever exposed to a new menu. Again, estimates are 
qualitatively small and statistically insignificant, with low F-statistics for joint significance. Results available upon 
request. Lastly, we find similar results when we run the analysis using only school fixed-effects and including 
controls for student race and ethnicity. Results available upon request. 
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 The size of the coefficients and statistical insignificance of estimates across both sets of 
models suggest that school and student characteristics do not predict menu changes, thereby 
further boosting confidence in a causal interpretation of the main results.  
Falsification test 
  
 If the link between a new menu adoption and student lunch participation is causal, then a 
future new menu adoption should have no impact on current outcomes and estimates should be 
statistically insignificant. Otherwise, our estimates may be reflecting changes in participation 
that pre-date and perhaps precipitate a new menu adoption. We test by recoding our “Post New 
Menu” variable to take a value of one in the year prior to a new menu adoption, “Early Post New 
Menu,” and re-run the analysis as above. Since this new variable conflates an incorrect and 
correct timing of a new menu adoption, we would expect the estimates to be qualitatively smaller 
than the estimates from our main specification, statistically insignificant, or both. As seen in 
Panel A of Table A12, estimates are smaller and statistically insignificant. Examining the effect 
overtime in Panel B reveals statistically significant estimates in line with those above for “Early 
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY,” which reflects the correct timing of a new menu adoption.  
Additionally, we examine the relationship between a new menu and student participation 
in school breakfast. Since the menus considered in this analysis pertain to lunch, it would be 
surprising if we found similar effects on breakfast participation. We rerun the baseline model 
substituting the lunch participation outcomes for measures of breakfast participation and present 
the results in Table A13.  As expected, a new lunch menu is not related to breakfast 






 As the second largest food assistance program in the United States, the NSLP can 
improve nutritional intake and reduce the prevalence of food insecurity among children and 
adolescents. Participating in school lunch is also associated with better academic outcomes, 
which benefits both students and schools. However, realizing these benefits requires that students 
participate, but nearly half of all school-aged students do not take advantage of the program. In 
response to common criticism that meals served by schools are unappealing and therefore 
deterring student participation, school districts nationwide have increased efforts to reformulate 
their menus. Yet the link between menus and lunch participation has to date not been rigorously 
investigated. This paper begins to fill this gap.  
 Using unique, detailed longitudinal data on students, schools, and lunch menus in NYC, 
this study suggests that introducing new menus increases student participation in school lunch. 
Students who are exposed to new menus are more likely to participate in school lunch and 
participate more frequently. These results are robust to different samples, identifying 
assumptions, and model specifications, thereby encouraging a causal interpretation of the results. 
Furthermore, stratifying the analysis by student characteristics suggests increases in participation 
among Black, White, female, higher income, and high school students—all groups with low 
participation rates in New York City. New menus may therefore help to close demographic and 
socioeconomic gaps in lunch participation.   
Exploring the relationship between new menus and UFM suggests that the effect may be 
driven primarily by students in schools offering free meals, which could indicate that prices or 
stigma constitute a barrier to lunch participation that the introduction of new menus alone cannot 
overcome. Effects in non-UFM schools could not be ruled out, however. Disaggregating the 
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analysis by specific menu types reveals that what is served, how it is served, and the environment 
in which it is served also matters, and that innovative non-standard menus may be more 
effective. The food court menu—offering the greatest variety, daily access to popular food items, 
self-service stations, and, in some cases, including cafeteria renovations—is associated with the 
greatest increase in lunch participation. The alternative menus—offering more scratch cooked 
and less processed meals—may also increase the share of students participating, though likely 
not how often they participate. In contrast, the express menus serving mostly hot and cold 
sandwiches are associated with lower participation. Together, these results suggest that the 
variety, type, and preparation of meals served as part of menus matter, but that the method and 
environment in which they are served is also important. We plan to explore these nuances further 
in future work. Lastly, we find no evidence that new menus are related to attendance or adverse 
weight outcomes. 
While New York City offers a unique opportunity to study the relationship between 
school menus and student lunch participation, it is worth noting that the findings of this study 
may not be generalizable to other contexts. Although the New York City school district reflects 
the growing diversity of the United States’ middle and high school student population and has 
implemented innovative approaches to school meals similar to those trending nationwide, it 
enjoys economies of scale that other, smaller districts may not have. To the extent that scale 
matters, the results presented in this study may be most applicable to other large school districts 
or groups of districts that have formed purchasing cooperatives. Arguably, however, the insights 
offered in this study can help school officials make more informed decisions about their lunch 
programs and provides evidence in support of the efforts that many are currently taking to 
reformulate their menus. 
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To summarize, this paper presents the first large-scale, rigorous evidence on the link 
between school menus and lunch participation, and suggests that the efforts of school districts 
nationwide to introduce new menus may prove fruitful. However, our findings also suggest 
reformulated menus alone are not a panacea, and that the cost of meals to students and features 
of menus and the cafeteria environment warrant serious consideration. Furthermore, while it is 
important to get students to participate in school lunch, it is also important that they make the 
appropriate dietary choices as they go through the lunch line (e.g., Toossi, 2017). Future work 
should also assess the effect that new menus have on the student’s dietary choices. 
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Figures & Tables 
Figure 1. Lunch Menus Offered by Schools by Year 
 
Note: Figure depicts the lunch menus available to schools by year as listed on the OFNS website. Dark 
blue bars indicate menu availability. The food court menu available in years 2008-2011 differs from that 
introduced in 2018. “HS” denotes high school, “MS” denotes middle school, and “K-8” denotes 
















































HS Standard 108         
HS Alternative 52 65        
HS Express Cold 11 9 21       
HS Express Hot 38 19 5 40      
MS Standard 87 49 13 36 94     
K-8 Standard 75 48 12 32 80 83    
K-8 Alternative 45 49 10 13 43 43 54   
K-8 Express Cold 12 10 20 5 14 13 11 24  
K-8 Express Hot 45 21 6 34 44 41 19 6 48 
Note:  Figures in the diagonal cells represent the total number of food items in a menu. Figures in other 







































Note: Panel A depicts food items served as part of the HS standard menu for the week of May 1st 
through May 5th of 2017. Panel B depicts food items served across the HS standard and alternative 













Figure 4. Average Number of Food Items Available Daily Across Menus 
 






























Figure 5. Differences in Lunch Participation Rates Across Students 
Panel A: By Student Characteristics 
 
Panel B: By Grade 
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Figure 6. Differential Responsive to New Menus by Student Characteristics 
 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not 
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year 
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as 












Figure 7. Relationship between Specific Menu Types and Lunch Participation 
 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not 
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year 
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as 
school UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. Reference category in each is the HS standard 





























Variable (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Hispanic .40  .39 .40 -.01  .39 .41 -.01 
Asian/Other .19  .20 .20 .00  .21 .17 .04 
Black .26  .26 .26 .00  .25 .28 -.03 
White .15  .15 .15 .00  .15 .14 .01 
Non-English at Home .47  .46 .47 -.01  .47 .46 .01 
Female .50  .49 .49 .00  .50 .49 .01 
Ever FRPL .91  .91 .91 -.01  .91 .90 .01 
SWD .14  .14 .14 .00  .14 .14 -.01 
Attendance Rate 83  84 82 2.00  85 78 7.00 
In UFM School .45  .42 .49 -.07  .49 .41 .08 
          
Students 844,216  334,126 510,090   478,238 365,978  
Observations 2,331,963  889,613 1,255,294   1,406,789 642,762  
Schools 1,013  787 1013   885 1013  
Note: Descriptive statistics pooled across AY 2014-2018. Column 1 presents statistics for all grade 6-12 students attending traditional public 
schools in NYC. Columns 2 and 5 present  statistics for students in the stable school and full samples, respectively. Columns 3 and 6 do so for 




Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Ever and Never New Menu Students in Analytic Samples 
 Exposure to a New Menu 
 Stable School Sample  Full Sample 
 Ever Never Diff.  Ever Never Diff. 
Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
LPrate 40 40 0.00  41 40 1.00 
EverLP1 .87 .85 .02  .89 .85 .04 
EverLP10 .72 .71 .01  .76 .71 .04 
EverLP20 .65 .64 .01  .68 .65 .04 
Hispanic .41 .39 .02  .38 .40 -.01 
Asian/Other .15 .20 -.05  .22 .20 .02 
Black .27 .26 .01  .22 .26 -.04 
White .17 .15 -.02  .17 .14 .03 
Non-English at Home .43 .46 -.04  .48 .47 -.01 
Female .49 .50 -.01  .50 .50 .00 
Ever FRPL .89 .91 -.02  .91 .91 .00 
SWD .16 .13 .02  .13 .14 .00 
Attendance Rate 84 85 -1.00  86 84 2.00 
In UFM School .44 .42 .02  .59 .43 .16 
        
Students 20,278 313,848   132,367 345,871  
Observations 57,938 831,675   464,033 942,756  
Schools 90 770   882 858  
Note: Descriptive statistics pooled across AY 2014-2018. Columns 1 and 4 present descriptive statistics 
students in the stable school and full samples, respectively, that are ever exposed to a new menu. Columns 
2 and 5 do so for students never exposed to a new menu. Differences in characteristics across the ever and 




















Table 3. Variation in Analytic Sample, AY 2014-2018 
 Analytic Samples 
 Full Stable School 
VARIABLES (2) (4) 
New Menu .33 .07 
New School .37 - 
New Principal .33 .28 
Years Observed 3.24 2.88 
   
Students 478,238 334,126 
Observations 1,406,789 889,613 
Schools 885 787 
Note: Table shows percent of students across all years that experienced a menu, school, or principal 












































Standard 226 535 612 691 672 
Non-Standard 14 32 49 58 64 
        Express 5 8 15 23 20 
        Alternative 9 24 34 35 34 
        Food Court 0 0 0 0 10 
      
School Adopt A New Menu - 5 19 26 53 
   Adopt a Standard - 3 10 16 34 
       Alternative - 2 5 6 8 
       Express - 0 4 4 1 
       Food Court - 0 0 0 10 
      
Switch from      
   Standard to Standard - 3 9 15 28 
   Standard to Non-Standard - 2 9 10 18 
   Non-Standard to Non-Standard - 0 0 0 1 
   Non-Standard to Standard - 0 1 1 6 
      
Total Schools 240 567 661 749 736 
Note: Values in cells represent the number of schools serving a specific menu type or adopting a new 























Table 5. Results for EverLP & LPrate 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Overall Effect     
Post New Menu 0.032** 0.042** 0.033 2.45* 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (1.42) 
     
Panel B: Effect Over Time    
Post New Menu 1st AY 0.027** 0.041** 0.034* 2.60* 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (1.43) 
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY 0.067* 0.049 0.022 1.27 
 (0.037) (0.032) (0.031) (2.34) 
     
Average EverLP .85 .71 .64 39.8 
Observations 889,613 889,613 889,613 889,613 
R-squared 0.688 0.719 0.708 0.77 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not 
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year 
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as 
school UFM status, new principal, and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the 





























Table 6. Results for EverLP & LPrate, UFM 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
UFM 0.088*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 4.476*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.929) 
Post New Menu*No UFM 0.015 0.030 0.009 0.572 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (1.577) 
Post New Menu*UFM 0.039** 0.047** 0.043* 3.264** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (1.608) 
     
Average EverLP/LPrate .85 0.71 0.64 39.8 
Observations 889,613 889,613 889,613 889,613 
R-squared 0.688 0.719 0.708 0.774 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not 
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year 
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as 
school principal change and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level 































Table 7. Results for New Non-Standard Menu 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Non-Standard Menu -0.004 -0.005 -0.011 -2.64 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (3.03) 
Post New Menu*Standard Menu 0.009 0.024 0.014 0.34 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.022) (1.83) 
Post New Menu*Non-Standard Menu 0.062* 0.067* 0.062 6.41* 
 (0.033) (0.037) (0.043) (3.53) 
     
Average EverLP/LPrate .85 .71 .64 39.8 
Observations 889,613 889,613 889,613 889,613 
R-squared 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.77 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not 
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year 
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as 
school UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the 




































VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Overall Effect      
Post New Menu 0.041 0.004 -0.010** -0.026 -0.005* 
 (0.373) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.002) 
      
Panel B: Effect Over Time     
Post New Menu 1st AY 0.118 0.005 -0.011** -0.029* -0.005** 
 (0.364) (0.004) (0.005) (0.017) (0.002) 
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY -0.559 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.708) (0.004) (0.007) (0.020) (0.004) 
      
Observations 889,613 777,745 777,745 777,745 777,745 
R-squared 0.770 0.714 0.851 0.925 0.942 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not 
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include student, grade, and year 
fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as 
school UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. The sample for columns 2 through 5 are restricted 
to students with weight data in years AY2014-2017. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the 


























Table A1. Distribution of Schools with POS Systems by Academic Year 
 AY 2014 AY 2015 AY 2016 AY 2017 AY 2018 
POS School 484 672 772 888 881 
Non-POS School 489 295 183 41 40 
Total 973 967 955 929 921 
Note: Table shows the distribution of schools with and without POS systems across years among those 
serving grades 6 through 12. A POS school is a school with a point-of-service system and a Non-POS 
school is one without the system. 
 
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics for Schools with and Without POS Systems 
  By School POS Status Analytic Samples 
 All Students No Yes Full Stable School 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hispanic .40 .44 .39 .39 .39 
Asian/Other .19 .14 .20 .21 .20 
Black .26 .30 .25 .25 .26 
White .15 .13 .15 .15 .15 
Non-English at Home .47 .43 .47 .47 .46 
Female .50 .51 .49 .50 .49 
Ever FRPL .91 .93 .91 .91 .91 
SWD .14 .15 .14 .14 .14 
Attendance Rate .83 .84 .83 .85 .84 
In UFM School .45 .33 .47 .49 .42 
Grade 6 .13 .18 .12 .10 .12 
Grade 7 .13 .19 .13 .15 .15 
Grade 8 .14 .19 .13 .14 .09 
Grade 9 .17 .12 .17 .17 .12 
Grade 10 .16 .12 .17 .17 .18 
Grade 11 .14 .10 .14 .15 .18 
Grade 12 .13 .10 .14 .11 .16 
New School .45 .50 .44 .37 - 
New Principal .37 .38 .37 .33 .28 
      
Students 844,216 228,800 789,870 478,238 334,126 
Student-Year 2,331,963 327,588 2,004,375 1,406,789 889,613 
Schools 1,013 513 951 885 787 
Note: Table presents descriptive statistics pooled across AY 2014 through AY 2018. Columns 1, 2 and 3 
presents summary statistics for all NYC traditional public-school students in grades 6 through 12, those in 
schools without POS systems, and those in school with POS systems, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 
present descriptive statistics for the full and stable school analytic samples for reference. The full analytic 
sample is smaller than the sample of all students in POS schools because of the requirement that students 





Table A3. Results for EverLP & LPrate, Full Sample 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Overall Effect    
Post Menu Change 0.020* 0.030** 0.025 2.50** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (1.25) 
     
Panel B: Effect Over Time    
Post New Menu 1st AY 0.020* 0.032** 0.027 2.48* 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (1.32) 
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY  0.018* 0.023* 0.018 2.57** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (1.19) 
     
Average EverLP/LPrate .86 .73 .66 40.5 
Observations 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789 
R-squared 0.642 0.676 0.666 0.74 
Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single 
menu. All models include student, school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary 
language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM status, principal 
change, and enrollment. Panel A presents the estimates for the overall effect of a new menu adoption. 
Panel B shows the estimates for the effect over time. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the 
school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 
Table A4. Results for EverLP & LPrate, Restricted Stable School Sample 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Overall Effect     
Post New Menu 0.013 0.024 0.016 2.18 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (1.41) 
     
Panel B: Effect Over Time     
Post New Menu 0.019 0.020 0.008 1.68 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (1.57) 
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY  0.046 0.006 -0.029 -0.58 
 (0.036) (0.046) (0.051) (3.82) 
     
Average EverLP/LPrate .87 .72 .65 40.10 
Observations 57,938 57,938 57,938 57,938 
R-squared 0.644 0.701 0.692 0.76 
Note: Stable school sample restricted to students who ever experience a new menu. All models include 
student, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education 
services, as well as school UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. Panel A presents the estimates for 
the overall effect of a new menu adoption. Panel B shows the estimates for the effect over time. Standard 
errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table A5. Results for LPrate, Students with History of Lunch Participation 
 Sample 
 Stable School Full 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Panel A: Overall Effect   
Post New Menu 2.60* 2.69** 
 (1.55) (1.34) 
   
Panel B: Effect Over Time  
Post New Menu 1st AY 2.75* 2.64* 
 (1.56) (1.41) 
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY  1.27 2.91** 
 (2.48) (1.30) 
   
Average LPrate 45.8 45.4 
Observations 763,784 1,238,703 
R-squared 0.74 0.71 
Note: Stable (full) school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who 
do not (who do) change schools and attend schools serving a single menu with a history of lunch 
participation (EverLP1 in period t-1). All models include student, grade, and year fixed effects, and 
control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as school UFM 
status, new principal and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level 

























Table A6. Results for EverLP & LPrate, School Fixed-Effects, Stable School Sample 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Overall Effect     
Post New Menu 0.029* 0.035* 0.023 1.52 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (1.44) 
     
Panel B: Effect Over Time     
Post New Menu 1st AY 0.023 0.035* 0.026 1.99 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (1.45) 
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY  0.057 0.034 0.009 -0.66 
 (0.037) (0.032) (0.030) (2.00) 
     
Average EverLP/LPrate .85 0.71 0.64 39.8 
Student-Year Obs. 888,837 888,837 888,837 888,837 
R-squared 0.220 0.246 0.245 0.29 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not 
change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. All models include school, grade, and year fixed 
effects, and control for student race/ethnicity, gender, primary language at home, and special education 
services, as well as school UFM status, new principal, and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and 
clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 
 
Table A7. Results for EverLP & LPrate, School Fixed-Effects, Full Sample 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Overall Effect     
Post New Menu 0.024 0.035 0.026 1.96 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (1.67) 
     
Panel B: Effect Over Time     
Post New Menu 0.020 0.035 0.029 2.24 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (1.71) 
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY  0.042 0.033 0.014 0.90 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (2.24) 
     
Average EverLP/LPrate .87 .72 .66 40.57 
Student-Year Obs. 1,404,624 1,404,624 1,404,624 1,404,624 
R-squared 0.206 0.231 0.228 0.28 
Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single 
menu. All models include student, school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary 
language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM status, principal 
change, and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, 





Table A8. Results for EverLP & LPrate, Weight Controls, Stable School Sample 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Overall Effect     
Post New Menu 0.020* 0.037** 0.028 1.74 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (1.46) 
     
Panel B: Effect Over Time     
Post New Menu 1st AY 0.015 0.035** 0.029 1.89 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (1.49) 
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY 0.060 0.052* 0.022 0.45 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.031) (2.30) 
     
Average EverLP/LPrate .86 .72 .66 40.4 
Observations 777,745 777,745 777,745 777,745 
R-squared 0.698 0.728 0.717 0.78 
Note: Stable school sample restricted to students with weight and height data. All models include student, 
grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home, special education services, 
underweight, overweight, and obese, as well as school UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. Panel A 
presents the estimates for the overall effect of a new menu adoption. Panel B shows the estimates for the 




Table A9. Results for EverLP & LPrate, Excluding Food Court Menu, Stable School 
Sample 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Post New Menu 0.028** 0.026 0.011 1.01 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (1.44) 
     
Observations 877,985 877,985 877,985 877,985 
R-squared 0.689 0.720 0.708 0.77 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not 
change schools, attend schools serving a single menu, and are not exposed to the food court menu. All 
models include school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student race/ethnicity, gender, 
primary language at home, and special education services, as well as school UFM status, new principal, 










Table A10. Predicting New Menu Adoptions, School Level 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Average LPrate -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
% EverLP1 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
% EverLP10 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
% EverLP20 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
% Female -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
% Asian -0.001 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
% Black -0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
% White 0.005 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
% Ever FRPL -0.004 -0.011 
 (0.006) (0.010) 
% SWD  -0.003 -0.006** 
      (0.003) (0.003) 
% Non-English at Home -0.002 0.000 
      (0.002) (0.003) 
   
School-Year Obs. 2,070 1,198 
Schools 665 502 
R-squared 0.402 0.472 
F-Statistic 0.94 0.83 
Note: Schools in the stable school sample. All models include school and year fixed-effects, the estimates 
for which are typically small and statistically insignificant. Sample is further restricted to observations 
with no new menu in period t for the analysis in column 2. The last observation of each school is dropped 
for the analysis in column 1, and the first and last for that in column 2. The dependent variable in each 
specification is an indicator variable for adopting a new menu in time t+1, and all left-hand side variables 
are school characteristics in time t. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** 












Table A11. Predicting New Menu Exposures, Student Level 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
LPrate -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
EverLP1 0.011 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.012) 
EverLP10 0.008 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.007) 
EverLP20 -0.002 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
SWD -0.014** -0.017 
 (0.006) (0.013) 
Non-English at Home 0.019 0.029 
 (0.015) (0.042) 
   
Observations 399,626 99,767 
Students 172,817 48,091 
R-Squared 0.491 0.504 
F-Statistic 1.20 0.74 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who 
do not change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. Sample is further restricted to 
observations with no new menu in period t for the analysis in column 2. All models include 
student, grade, and year fixed-effects. The last observation of each student is dropped for the 
analysis in columns 1, and the first and last observations for that in column 2. The dependent 
variable in each specification is an indicator variable for a menu change in time t+1, and all 
right-hand side variables are time-varying student characteristics in time t. Standard errors in 





















Table A12. Falsification Test: Results for EverLP & LPrate, Stable School Sample 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Overall Effect    
Early Post New Menu 0.028 0.029 0.010 -0.252 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.027) (1.977) 
     
Panel B: Over Time     
Early Post New Menu 1st AY 0.015 0.010 -0.007 -1.679 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (1.834) 
Early Post New Menu gt. 1 AY 0.028** 0.040*** 0.035* 2.910** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (1.299) 
     
Student-Year Obs. 889,613 889,613 889,613 889,613 
R-squared 0.688 0.719 0.708 0.773 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students in schools 
serving a single menu who do not change schools. All models include student, grade, and year fixed 
effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as school 
UFM status, principal change, and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the 
school level. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 
 
Table A13. Falsification Test, Breakfast Participation, Stable School Sample 
 EverBP1 EverBP10 EverBP20 BPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (5) (6) 
     
Post New Menu 0.017 0.006 -0.005 0.17 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (1.51) 
     
Student-Year Obs. 889,613 889,613 889,613 889,613 
R-squared 0.649 0.684 0.671 0.74 
Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single 
menu. All models include student, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary language 
at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM status, principal change, 
and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, ** 








Table A14. Results for EverLP & LPrate by Student Characteristics 
 Race/Ethnicity Gender FRPL Status Grade 
 EverLP1 LPrate EverLP1 LPrate EverLP1 LPrate EverLP1 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
         
Post New Menu*Asian/Other 0.018 0.514       
 (0.011) (1.681)       
Post New Menu*Hispanic 0.013 0.757       
 (0.011) (1.387)       
Post New Menu*Black 0.032** 4.154**       
 (0.014) (2.056)       
Post New Menu*White 0.086** 5.251***       
 (0.034) (1.938)       
Post New Menu*Male   0.021** 3.062**     
   (0.010) (1.519)     
Post New Menu*Female   0.043** 1.799     
   (0.018) (1.456)     
Post New Menu*Never FRPL     0.138*** 7.535***   
     (0.047) (1.697)   
Post New Menu*Ever FRPL     0.018* 1.777   
     (0.010) (1.446)   
Post New Menu*Grades 6-8       -0.011 0.795 
       (0.012) (1.844) 
Post New Menu*Grades 9-12       0.055*** 3.335* 
       (0.019) (1.926) 
         
Average EverLP/LPrate .848 39.8 .848 39.8 .848 39.8 .848 39.8 
Observations 883,437 883,437 889,482 889,482 889,613 889,613 889,613 889,613 
R-squared 0.688 0.773 0.688 0.774 0.688 0.774 0.688 0.774 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students who do not change schools and attend schools serving a single menu. 
All models include student, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as school UFM 




Table A15. Results for EverLP & LPrate by Student Characteristics, Full Sample 
 Race/Ethnicity Gender FRPL Status Grade 
 EverLP1 LPrate EverLP1 LPrate EverLP1 LPrate EverLP1 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
         
Post New Menu*Asian/Other 0.028*** 3.216**       
 (0.010) (1.298)       
Post New Menu*Hispanic 0.020** 2.104*       
 (0.010) (1.191)       
Post New Menu*Black 0.016 1.855       
 (0.010) (1.412)       
Post New Menu*White 0.014 3.804***       
 (0.016) (1.350)       
Post New Menu*Male   0.029*** 4.362***     
   (0.010) (1.294)     
Post New Menu*Female   0.010 0.561     
   (0.011) (1.247)     
Post New Menu*Never FRPL     0.012 4.247***   
     (0.020) (1.294)   
Post New Menu*Ever FRPL     0.021** 2.312*   
     (0.010) (1.245)   
Post New Menu*Grades 6-8       -0.004 2.148 
       (0.009) (1.674) 
Post New Menu*Grades 9-12       0.035** 2.720* 
       (0.015) (1.638) 
         
Student-Year Obs. 1,398,446 1,398,446 1,406,572 1,406,572 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789 
R-squared 0.642 0.736 0.642 0.736 0.642 0.736 0.642 0.736 
Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single menu. All models include student, school, 
grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school 
UFM status, principal change, and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table A16. Results for EverLP & LPrate, UFM, Full Sample 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
UFM 0.085*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 3.534*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.978) 
Post New Menu*No UFM -0.003 0.009 0.007 1.791 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (1.204) 
Post New Menu*UFM 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.035** 2.900** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (1.321) 
     
Average EverLP/LPrate 0.86 0.73 0.66 40.5 
Observations 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789 
R-squared 0.642 0.676 0.666 0.736 
Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a 
single menu. All models include student, school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student 
primary language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM 
status, principal change, and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the 
school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 
 
Table A17. Results for New Non-Standard Menu, Full Sample 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Non-Standard Menu 0.001 -0.006 0.003 -2.38 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.026) (3.07) 
Post New Menu*Standard Menu 0.004 0.011 0.013 1.38 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.015) (1.20) 
Post New Menu*Non-Standard Menu 0.051* 0.070** 0.049 5.86 
 (0.029) (0.035) (0.042) (3.57) 
     
Average EverLP/LPrate .86 .73 .66 40.5 
Observations 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789 1,406,789 
R-squared 0.642 0.676 0.666 0.74 
Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single 
menu. All models include student, school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary 
language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM status, principal 
change, and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, 






Table A18. Results for EverLP and LPrate, Menu Type 
 EverLP1 EverLP10 EverLP20 LPrate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
MS Standard 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.411 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.018) (1.491) 
K-8 Standard 0.019 0.035 0.037 -0.174 
 (0.014) (0.026) (0.036) (2.947) 
Alternative 0.044 0.015 0.003 0.210 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.038) (2.366) 
Express -0.016 -0.037 -0.061 -6.813 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (4.600) 
Food Court 0.057* 0.125*** 0.138*** 8.605*** 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (2.724) 
     
Observations 889,613 889,613 889,613 889,613 
R-squared 0.688 0.719 0.708 0.773 
Note: Stable school sample including grade 6 through 12 traditional public school students in schools 
serving a single menu who do not change schools. All models include student, grade, and year fixed 
effects, and control for student primary language at home and special education services, as well as school 
UFM status, principal change, and total enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the 
school level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 







VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Overall Effect      
Post New Menu 0.555* 0.002 -0.005 -0.013 -0.002 
 (0.296) (0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.004) 
      
Panel B: Effect Over Time     
Post New Menu 1st AY 0.643** 0.003 -0.006 -0.017 -0.003 
 (0.287) (0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.004) 
Post New Menu gt. 1 AY 0.187 -0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.000 
 (0.338) (0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.003) 
      
Student-Year Obs. 1,406,789 882,037 882,037 882,037 882,037 
R-squared 0.760 0.706 0.847 0.920 0.939 
Note: Full sample includes all grade 6 through 12 students in traditional public schools serving a single 
menu. All models include student, school, grade, and year fixed effects, and control for student primary 
language at home, special education services, and school change, as well as school UFM status, principal 
change, and total enrollment. The sample for columns 2 through 5 are restricted to students with weight 
data in years AY2014-2017. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level (*** p<0.01, 
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Incentivizing healthy eating in children: An investigation of the “ripple” and “temporal” 




According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), healthy eating promotes the optimal 
growth and development of children while also reducing their risk for developing obesity and 
other illnesses (CDC, 2015). The consumption of fruits and vegetables is of particular 
importance, as they are not only key sources of fiber and essential micronutrients, but also help 
to mitigate weight gain (Rolls et al., 2004; Ledikwe et al., 2006; Vioque et al., 2008). Most 
American children ages two years and older do not, however, meet the United States Department 
of Agriculture’s (USDA) recommendations for a diet rich in fruits and vegetables. In contrast, 
their intake of sodium is more than the recommended maximum daily allowance and 40% of 
their daily caloric intake comes from added sugars and solid fats, approximately half of which 
are acquired through the consumption of various junk foods (CDC, 2015). Research also 
suggests that diet during childhood is a significant predictor of diet in adulthood, and that 
pediatric obesity has negative implications for adult health outcomes (Hingle, 2010; Nicklaus, 
2009; Birch, 1999).  
The latest figures available from the CDC indicate that, in the United States, 8.4% of 2- 
to 5-year-olds, 17.7% of 6- to 11-year-olds, and 20.5% of 12- to 19-year-olds are obese, a 
problem more acute among black, Hispanic, and low-income children (CDC, 2016). Given their 
adverse effects on normal development, the associated costs, and influence on long-term eating 
habits, the targeting of pediatric obesity and children’s unhealthy dietary choices are particularly 
important. Preventative measures designed to induce better eating behaviors earlier in the 
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lifecycle may therefore yield maximum health benefits and establish dietary habits that may 
persist into adulthood. 
A growing body of research examines the impacts of various interventions on 
encouraging healthy eating habits in school-aged children. These range from various non-
remunerative methods—used here to mean those in which participants are not provided a 
tangible, material reward in return for the performance of a particular behavior—to remunerative 
approaches—defined here as those in which participants receive some form of a tangible, 
material reward in exchange for behaving in a desired manner. Although the former have been 
studied extensively, the latter have generally been avoided due to concerns that their use may 
“crowd out” intrinsic motivation for healthy eating behaviors and result in worse outcomes after 
their removal (Horne et al., 2010), a phenomena sometimes also referred to as the 
“overjustification effect” or the “negative rebound effect” (Just and Price, 2012).  There exists, 
however, scant evidence in favor of such an adverse effect in the context of fruit and vegetable 
consumption (Horne et al., 2010), and the studies employing remunerative incentives find them 
to have no impact on children’s intrinsic motivations (Raju et al., 2010; Corsini et al., 2011; Just 
& Price 2013; Belot, James, & Nolen, 2013; Loewenstein, Price, and Volpp, 2016; List & 
Samek, 2015a, 2015b). 
 Existing studies also suggest that remunerative interventions may be more cost-effective 
than their non-remunerative counterparts, which tend to be costly, time-consuming, and labor-
intensive to put into practice (Hendy et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2012) while producing little, if 
any, changes in dietary behaviors. Such interventions often involve changes to school curricula, 
time-intensive involvement of everyone involved (e.g., teachers, staff, parents, or children), 
costly materials (e.g., equipment or educational and informational materials), or the alteration of 
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the physical aspects of school, home, or community environments (Cauwenberghe et al., 2010; 
Evans et al., 2012; Hendrie et al., 2016). In contrast, remunerative interventions employing small 
rewards worth 50 cents or less—even as low as a nickel (USD $0.05)—have been shown to 
produce large changes in the choice and consumption of fruits and vegetables (Raju et al., 2010; 
Just & Price 2013; Belot, James, & Nolen, 2013; Loewenstein, Price, and Volpp, 2016; List & 
Samek, 2015a, 2015b). Simply affixing such small rewards to an item has also been shown to 
increase their selection (List & Samek, 2015b), implying that such incentives may be effective at 
little additional burden, financial or otherwise.  
Given the promise of these initial studies, the impact of such rewards over time and their 
influence on behaviors outside of experimental settings warrant further study. Regarding the 
former, it may be that the effectiveness of rewards as a motivator in influencing dietary 
behaviors diminishes over time as the novelty of their introduction wears off. If so, this may 
imply that the frequency of their use, and the types of rewards used, may matter in designing a 
long-term effective remunerative intervention. Studies that have attempted to investigate the 
temporal dimensions of such interventions either suffer from significant data collection issues, 
employ complex intervention schemes, or use designs that combine multiple treatments. Raju, 
Rajagopal, and Gilbride (2010) find effects that fluctuated over the course of their study but 
recommend a cautious interpretation of their findings as they failed to collect data on 62% of 
their sample. The interventions tested in Belot, James, and Nolen (2013) consisted of a piece-rate 
scheme and a competition scheme in which children had to collect a certain number of stickers to 
be eligible for a prize at the end of each school week. While the piece rate scheme was found to 
be ineffective, the competition scheme produced sizeable effects that diminished with time 
overall but persisted for the subset of students who had some margin for improvement. Lastly, 
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Loewesnstein, Price, and Volpp (2014) found effects that did not fade out over time but used 
rewards in conjunction with a verbal prompt, making it difficult to attribute any effects to the 
presence of rewards themselves. 
As for the influence of rewards on behaviors in other contexts, no attempts have yet been 
made to discern their impact outside of intervention settings. Health outcomes will ultimately 
depend on whether any positive impacts on food choice within the intervention setting are off-set 
or out-weighed by poor eating behaviors in other settings, behaviors that may be exacerbated by 
the introduction of such incentives (Ransley et al., 2007; Evans et al., 2012; List and Samek, 
2015). The introduction of rewards may have three potential effects. They may increase fruit 
choice and consumption outside of the intervention setting if, for example, children, develop a 
taste or habit for them. It may also be that such an intervention has no effect on dietary behaviors 
outside of the setting in which it is administered. Lastly, the intervention may reduce the choice 
and consumption of fruits if children compensate for foregoing junk food earlier in the day by 
eating more of it in another setting. Of particular importance are behaviors at home where most 
habits are learned (De Bourdeaudhuij, 1997; Campbell et al., 2007; Dowda et al., 2001), the 
external setting of interest in this study.  
This study seeks to add to the small body of literature on remunerative approaches 
targeting children’s eating habits by shedding light on these issues in the context of fruit choice. 
It employs a removed treatment within-subject design in conjunction with parent surveys and 
presents the results of a month-long field experiment in which 23 low-income children ages 5 to 
8 attending a summer program were offered a small prize for choosing a fruit cup for dessert 
after lunch in lieu of cookies. The contributions are threefold. First, this study adds to the 
contexts in which such experiments have been conducted and, in conjunction with previous 
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studies, serves to bolster the case for the generalizability of existing findings. Second, by 
surveying parents about their children’s dietary behaviors at home, this study attempts to identify 
the potential impact of reward-based incentives on children’s eating behaviors outside of the 
intervention setting—labeled here as “ripple” effects. Third, this study gauges the efficacy of 
such interventions over time—labeled here as “temporal” effects—both between weeks and 
within weeks.  
Materials and Methods 
Experimental Design 
 
 This study employs a removed treatment within-subjects design. In within-subjects 
designs, participants serve as their own controls, thereby reducing the amount of error arising 
from natural variance between individuals. Such designs are, however, susceptible to various 
threats to internal validity. The plausibility of these threats is significantly diminished in the 
context of a treatment removal design (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001). In such a design, pre-
treatment observations are first recorded, after which the treatment is introduced and post-
treatment observations recorded. This is then followed by the removal of the treatment and 
further observation. If it can be demonstrated that the outcome of interest rises and falls with the 
presence or absence of the intervention, it becomes highly implausible that observed changes 
could be the result of alternative factors or extraneous events, thereby facilitating causal 
inferences.   
Location 
 
The field experiment was conducted at a Boys and Girls Club (BGC) location in central 
New York, and was approved by Syracuse University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) as well 
as the local branch of the BGC. The site serves low-income children ages 5 to 12 throughout the 
70 
 
year with an after-school program when school is in session and an all-day program during the 
summer months. During the summer, children are served breakfast and lunch, both of which are 
provided by the local school district and are standard meals that are also served in school 
cafeterias during the school year. These meals did not include dessert, which was introduced for 
the first time as a part of this experiment.  
School-like settings such as this serve as ideal testing grounds for interventions targeting 
eating habits among children since schools—the likely hosts of any large-scale intervention—are 
in a unique position to promote healthy eating as they offer opportunities for targeting large 
numbers of children while also providing up to half of their daily caloric intake (USDA, 2017; 
Briefel, Wilson, & Gleason, 2009). Additionally, summer programs may offer greater access to 
children most likely to benefit from interventions targeting dietary choices to the extent that they 
serve those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.  
Participants 
 
 Parents with children ages 5 to 8 were asked in person if they wished to participate in the 
study, and allow for their children to participate, as they arrived to pick up their children from 
the program. Mothers were targeted as research indicates that they are the most accurate source 
of information about the behavior patterns of their children (Hendy et al. 2005)—an important 
consideration since parent surveys are an integral component of this study. The age range was 
selected to fit the theme of early dietary interventions as well as to facilitate the investigation of 
“ripple effects” using parent surveys, which requires that children be old enough to express their 
preferences but still young enough to need their parents help in obtaining access to food. 
Of eligible parents who personally picked up their child from the site and indicated that 
they intended to enroll, or had enrolled, them in the summer program, 25 were solicited and only 
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one refused to participate. Of those who initially agreed to participate, 19 ultimately had their 
children attend the summer program. Upon consenting, assent was also obtained from their 
children, on whom socioeconomic and demographic information was collected. As summarized 
in Table 9, participants were predominantly Black and most children were part of low-income, 
single-parent households. 
In sum, 29 children and their parents were recruited for the study, of which 23 were present 
on at least one day during the field experiment. This sample comprises approximately 61% of all 
children ages 5 to 8 that were enrolled in the summer program, but likely more on any given day 
since some children attended sporadically.  
Timeline & Procedure 
 
On-site enrollment for the experiment began in mid-June of 2016. The recruitment period 
lasted three weeks, two of which occurred while school was still in session. The third week of 
recruitment took place during the first week of the site’s summer program. The four-week field 
experiment commenced immediately after the recruitment period. The first week was composed 
of pre-intervention baseline observations, the intervention was implemented the following two 
weeks, and the final week consisted of post-intervention removal observations. 
 During the first week of the experiment, children were told that they could choose 
between a fruit cup or a cookie cup for dessert. During the following intervention period, 
children were told that they could again choose between a fruit cup and a cookie cup for dessert, 
but that they would receive a prize for choosing the former and nothing for choosing the latter. 
The final post-intervention week mimicked the first week of the experiment. Children also had 
the option of choosing neither dessert in each period.  
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 After lunch, a tray of desserts was set out lined with white napkins displaying 24 
translucent plastic cups containing fruits on the left-hand side and 24 identical cups containing 
cookies on the right-hand side. Given that the site served between 45 and 60 children on any 
given day, additional fruit and cookie cups were prepared and set to the side in order to replenish 
the supply on the tray if necessary. The site director or, in some instances, another staff member 
would first ask all 5 to 8-year olds to line up by the food counter. As they approached the dessert 
tray, they were provided the appropriate information for that particular week and asked to make a 
choice. Once all 5 to 8-year olds had been served, the site director or staff member would ask the 
9 to 12-year-old children to line up by the food counter, after which the process was repeated. 
After the 9 to 12-year olds had been served, the 5 to 8 year olds were once again asked to line up 
by the counter so that the consumption of participating children could be recorded. All of the 
children were instructed not to throw away their cups until their consumption was recorded. The 
cups of participating children were examined to see how much they had eaten, and consumption 
was recorded as either a quarter, half, three quarters, all of a cup, or none. 
Prizes 
 
Prizes included small notepads, pencils, pencil sharpeners, rubber balls, rings, airplanes, 
and finger lights, each worth on average roughly 10 cents.  These prizes were chosen since the 
reward value of similar items were established in List & Samek (2015). Prizes also varied in 
color and design in order to ensure that children would continue to value them throughout the 
experiment, as per List and Samek (2015). Children choosing a fruit cup during the intervention 
period were allowed to choose one prize from among the options listed, which were set on the 
countertop next to the dessert tray within sight. 
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Parent Pre-Survey and Post-Surveys and Daily Logs 
 
 A novel component of this study is its attempt to provide insights on the ripple effects of 
remunerative interventions—that is to say, in this context, the effect of rewards introduced in the 
experimental setting on children’s eating behaviors at home. To do so, this study employs both 
pre- and post-intervention surveys and daily logs, to be completed by participating parents. The 
purpose of incorporating both surveys and the daily logs is twofold. First, including both allows 
for the pre- and post-survey responses to not only be compared with one another to identify any 
differences in a child’s eating behavior, but also to be compared with the results from the daily 
logs to corroborate their veracity. If, for example, the trend in the daily logs and survey 
responses are positively correlated, confidence in the accuracy of the responses is enhanced. 
Second, in the event that one of the methods produces unusable responses, perhaps due to 
respondent related issues, the other may be used as a substitute. In both cases, parents were 
motivated to complete the surveys and daily logs with a cash incentive.34 
Parents were asked to complete the first survey upon enrollment prior to the 
implementation of the experiment in order to establish a baseline and the second a week after its 
conclusion. To reduce the burden on parents and minimize respondent fatigue, the surveys were 
comprised of six questions adapted from the Child Eating Behavior Inventory.35 Similarly, 
parents were also asked to maintain a daily log—including weekends—of their child’s behavior 
and preferences regarding fruits for the duration of the experiment. To minimize burden and 
 
34 Parents could earn up to $25 per child. Parents were given $3 for completing the first survey, $5 per completed 
daily log, and $2 for the final survey. 
35 The Child Eating Behavior Inventory comprises 40 items that are rated on a 5-point scale with response options 
being “never,” “seldom,” “sometimes,” “often,” and “always.” It is a parent-report instrument designed to assess 
childhood eating and mealtime problems. Six of the 40 questions were selected and modified to fit the context in 




respondent fatigue for the daily logs, parents were asked to answer six short “yes or no” 
questions each night of the week.  
Desserts 
 
The healthy dessert in this experiment consisted of a fruit cup, while the unhealthy 
dessert consisted of a cookie cup. Fruits are nutrient-dense and are therefore recommended by 
the USDA for their health benefits. In fact, the USDA recommends that individuals increase their 
fruit consumption as part of a healthy eating pattern (USDHHS & USDA, 2015). In contrast, 
cookies provide little nutrients and are high in sugar content.  Fruit cups weighed approximately 
85 grams, 5 grams more than the minimum serving size recommended by any governmental 
agency in the OECD (Evans et al., 2012).36 In an effort to ensure equal familiarity with both 
desserts, fruits and cookies were chosen such that they would be universally recognizable. 
Apples, pears, grapes, and bananas were served as the fruit options and chocolate chip and Oreo 
cookies were served as the cookie options. Combinations of fruits served varied by type and 
color, as did cookies, in order to mitigate the risk of children losing interest in the food items.37 
Data Analysis 
 
The analysis employs standard experimental methods, supplemented by econometric 
analysis. Changes in children’s dessert choice between weeks are first analyzed using two-tailed 
paired sample t-tests. The longitudinal nature of the data collection produced 358 participant-day 
observations, thereby also facilitating the use of regression analysis. The comparison of means 
tests in the proportion of fruit cups chosen by participating children are therefore supplemented 
 
36 USDA recommendations differ by type of fruit and how it is served. Consequently, no one standard applies to an 
assortment of fruits. Therefore, the minimum OECD requirement, in grams, was used for each serving. 




by logistic regressions with dessert choice as the dependent variable—where dessert choice 
equals 1 if a child chose a fruit cup and 0 if they chose a cookie cup or neither—and a treatment 
dummy as the independent variable of interest, conditional on attendance. The results of a linear 
probability model (LPM) are also presented to facilitate the reporting and interpretation of 
marginal effects. All regressions include individual fixed effects to account for any time-
invariant participant-specific characteristics and standard errors clustered at the individual level.  
Results 
Attendance, Consumption, & Prize Selection 
  
 Ideally, participating children would have been observed on each of the 20 weekdays of 
the study. Attendance for some children was, however, sporadic. As a result, roughly 78% of the 
potential 460 child-day observations were those for which the children were present on site. In 
sum, participating children made a total of 358 decisions during the four weeks of the 
experiment, of which 50.84% resulted in the choice of a fruit cup and 46.65% that of a cookie 
cup. Neither dessert option was chosen in only nine out of the 358 instances, constituting 2.33% 
of total decisions. Among those who chose a dessert, consumption was near universal, with the 
contents of fruit and cookie cups being consumed in their entirety 95% of the time, as shown in 
Table 10. Cheating was not observed by myself or by any members of the staff. Also depicted is 
prize selection. Descriptive statistics suggest that non-school related prizes were the most 
desirable, particularly the finger-lights and the rubber balls, which constituted approximately 
44% and 34% of all prize selections, respectively.38  
 
38 Prize selection was calculated by taking the total number of rewards ordered prior to the beginning of the study 
and subtracting from that what remained after its conclusion. IRB, however, required that prizes and desserts be 
made available to all children present on site, regardless of their participation status. Since all children present were 




Baseline, Treatment, and Post-Treatment Week Comparisons on Selection 
The change in dessert choice among participants who chose a dessert, averaged across 
days for each week, is depicted in Figure 8.  There were large changes between Week 1 and the 
intervention weeks, and between the intervention weeks and week 4. The statistical significance 
of these differences is assessed using paired sample t-tests. The proportion of children choosing 
fruit cups increased from 32% in Week 1 to 81% in Week 2 (p < .001), decreased from 81% to 
64% between Weeks 2 and 3 (p = .023), and fell further from 64% to 29% between Weeks 3 and 
4 (p = .003). A comparison of children’s pre- and post-intervention choices also showed no 
change, as indicated by the statistical insignificance of the difference in the proportion choosing 
fruits between Weeks 1 and 4, which were 32% and 29% respectively (p = .33).  
 
The results from the fixed-effect logistic and linear probability model regressions, which 
corroborate these results, are depicted in Table 11. Models 1 and 3 are fixed-effect logistic 
models whereas Models 2 and 4 are linear probability models. To identify the effect of the 
reward-based incentives in inducing the choice of fruit cups over that of cookie cups, the sample 
is restricted to observations collected in Weeks 1, 2, and 3 for models 1 and 2, and the treatment 
dummy is a binary variable that takes the value of 0 if the intervention was absent and 1 if 
present. To ascertain the effect of their removal, the sample used for models 3 and 4 is restricted 
to observations collected in Weeks 2, 3, and 4, and the treatment dummy takes the value of 1 if 
the intervention is absent and 0 if present. The coefficients on the variables of interest are 
statistically significant in each specification. The linear probability models show that the effects 
of the intervention are large in magnitude, with its introduction increasing the likelihood of a 




Separating the treatment effect by week also highlights the waning effect of the 
incentives over time. As shown in Table 12, the introduction of incentives increased the 
likelihood of a fruit cup being chosen by 45 percentage-points in the first week of the 
intervention (Week 2). By the second week (Week 3), this effect dropped to 28 percentage-
points. Further analysis also indicates that the effect of the incentives wane not only between 
intervention weeks but within intervention weeks as well, as depicted in Figure 9. The effect of 
the incentives are strongest during the first half of the first intervention week (Week 2: Monday, 
Tuesday, and Wednesday), in which they increase the likelihood of choosing a fruit cup by 49 
percentage-points. The effect then declines steadily to 26 percentage-points by the second half of 
the second intervention week (Week 3: Thursday and Friday). In both the between-week and 
within-week cases, the null hypothesis of equality between the aforementioned coefficients was 
rejected (p = .017 and p = .051, respectively).39  
Robustness Checks 
 
 If children’s absence was in some way related to their propensity to choose fruits or 
cookies, the sporadic attendance of some children may be a concern. However unlikely this 
might be, the sensitivity of the results to attendance were checked by restricting the sample to 
only those students who were present at least one day during each of the given periods of interest 
(i.e. the sample was restricted so that each child contributes to the analysis in each period).  For 
the overall and between week effects, participating children must have attended at least once 
during each week to be included in the analysis. For the within-week effects, each child must 
have attended at least once during each week half to be included in the analysis. Accounting for 
 
39 The null hypotheses of equality between all of the coefficients shown in Table 12 were tested and the p-values are 
shown in Table A20 of the Appendix. 
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attendance and re-conducting the analysis did not change the result, which remained almost 
identical to the original estimates. These results are presented in Table A21 of the Appendix. 
 Alternatively, it may be that the results of the within-week analysis may be sensitive to 
how the days are grouped. To investigate this possibility, the first half of each week was 
redefined to comprise of Monday and Tuesday, while the second half was redefined to include 
Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Doing so did not change the coefficient estimates, which 
again remained nearly identical to the original estimates, but led to an increase in the statistical 
significance of the difference between coefficients. These results are presented in Table A22 and 
Table A23 of the Appendix, respectively. Finally, three of the participating children had parents 
that were employed on site. Dropping these children and conducting the same analysis did not 
change the results. These results are depicted in Table A24 of the Appendix. 
Effect of Intervention on Children’s Preferences at Home 
 
Survey responses did not produce evidence of either a positive or negative “ripple” effect. 
Both pre-intervention and post-intervention Child Eating Behavior surveys were obtained for 16 
of the 23 children, constituting a response rate of approximately 70%. Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients for the pre-intervention and post-intervention surveys were .84 and .89, respectively. 
To get a sense of how parents perceptions may have changed overall, the survey scores across 
individuals for each period were aggregated (i.e. the sum of the total survey score for each child; 
minimum score possible = 5, maximum score possible = 30). The post-intervention aggregate 
score of 389 declined relative to the pre-intervention aggregate score of 422. This could suggest 
that—as a whole—parents felt worse about their children’s eating behaviors with regards to 
fruits. However, a two-tailed paired sample t-test indicates that the null hypothesis of no 
difference between pre- and post-survey responses cannot be rejected (p = .13). Consequently, 
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there is no statistical evidence that children’s eating behaviors outside of the experimental setting 
were affected due to the intervention.  
While the response rate to the surveys did allow for some inference, that for the daily 
logs was not sufficiently large for any meaningful analysis or comparison with the survey results. 
Although they did not contradict the survey findings, daily logs for each week were obtained for 
only seven of the children—constituting a 30% response rate. This was, however, a contingency 
that was planned for by having both pre- and post-surveys and daily logs. Although the results of 
the survey response analysis cannot be fully corroborated by a secondary measure, they 




 In the absence of randomized assignment into treatment and control groups, potential 
threats to internal validity in this context include “history,” “maturation,” and “experimenter” 
effects. The research design employed reduces the plausibility of these threats, however. History 
effects may be present if factors external to the experiment occurred concurrent to the 
intervention being introduced and removed that could also have affected fruit cup choice in the 
directions observed. There is no indication this was the case, however, since there were no 
changes in the site’s operations or in the school districts provision of meals during this time. 
Since participating children were eight years old and younger, any confounding extraneous 
factors would have had to occur at home, but there is nothing to suggest that anything changed 
significantly over the course of the four-week experiment.  
Given the length of the study and the ages of the participants involved, it is also unlikely 
that any observed effects could be attributed to the maturation of the participants. Furthermore, 
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that fruit cup choice increased with the introduction of the rewards and declined back to pre-
intervention levels after their removal suggests that no such maturation occurred. Experimenter 
effects may have biased the fruit cup selection and consumption upward if the presence of the 
researcher motivated the children to do so at higher rates than they otherwise would. To the 
extent possible, such an effect was mitigated with the inclusion of a baseline observation week, 
which would have accounted for any upward bias, and by restricting interactions with the 
subjects to the bare minimum necessary to execute the study. 
In addition to these potential confounders, there may exists a threat unique to the 
removed treatment within-subjects design that must be addressed. It may be that the decline in 
fruit cup choice may not be due to the removal of rewards but rather the result of a declining 
time trend in the desire to choose fruit cups. This study does, in fact, suggest that there may exist 
such a trend. To test whether the decline between the second half of Week 3 and the first half of 
Week 4, as seen in Figure 9, is a consequence of treatment removal, the sample was restricted to 
corresponding observations and a linear probability model regression was used. Dessert choice 
was regressed on a dummy variable representing the first half of Week 4 (Monday, Tuesday, and 
Wednesday), with a dummy representing the second half of Week 3 (Thursday and Friday) as the 
comparison. The analysis finds a 25-percentage point drop in the probability of choosing fruit 
cups associated with the removal of rewards (p = .08). The sharp decline in fruit cup choice 
between the second half of Week 3 and the first half of Week 4—from 61% to 35%—in 
conjunction with the overall sharp drop between Weeks 3 and 4—from 64% to 29%—implies 




Finally, like all such studies, randomized or not, “peer effects” are unavoidable.  Peer 
effects may be present if, for example, the introduction of rewards induced popular children to 
choose fruits, which in turn influenced the decision of their peers to do so as well. However, to 
the extent that peer effects bias the results upwards, they can be thought of as a desirable source 
of bias if they serve to increase fruit cup selection and consumption, which is the desired 
objective. Insofar as their presence has biased the results of this study downward, the magnitude 




 It is possible that parents were not entirely blind to the intervention and that their 
responses to the surveys may have been affected as a result. Of particular concern would be 
“social desirability” bias, whereby parents may have answered questions pertaining to their 
children’s preferences for fruits so as to be viewed more favorably. The decline in aggregate 
scores between the pre-survey and post-survey suggests that this may not be the case, but it may 
also be that the introduction of the first survey made parents more conscious of their children’s 
dietary behaviors such that their responses in the second survey were more indicative of their 
true preferences. 
To minimize such risks, parents were only provided the minimum amount of information 
about the experiment as required by IRB. They were informed that their children would be 
served desserts and would also have the opportunity to win prizes, but nothing was said about the 
motivation for the experiment, its objectives, or how it was to be implemented. While it is 
certainly possible that parents may have been aware of the aims of the study to some extent, and 
that survey responses reflected that knowledge, ethical and moral concerns would not allow the 
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nature of the experiment to be completely hidden from potential participants. However, this issue 
affects any study involving human participants and which requires their explicit consent.  
Discussion 
 
The introduction of small reward-based incentives increased the proportion of children 
choosing a fruit cup in lieu of a cookie cup for dessert after lunch, thereby corroborating the 
findings of existing studies. Also as in previous studies, no evidence was found to suggest that 
the introduction of rewards crowded out children’s intrinsic motivation.  Consumption was also 
high, with nearly all children consuming the contents of their chosen dessert cup in its entirety. 
Though the presence of small rewards in general appeared to excite and motivate the children, 
non-school related rewards appeared to be the most popular among the options available for 
those that chose a fruit cup. Further analysis also suggests that the effect of reward-based 
incentives wane over time, not only between weeks but also within weeks. The effect of the 
incentives on the likelihood of choosing a fruit cup declined by 37% between Weeks 2 and 3—
the first and last of the intervention weeks. Similarly, between the first half of Week 2 and the 
second half of Week 3, the effect of the incentives declined by nearly half.  
Together, all of the above-mentioned findings suggest that—at least in this context—
small reward-based incentives are effective for low-income children, though their effect 
diminishes over time and depends on the types of rewards offered. Future investigations of 
reward-based interventions administered daily are encouraged to provide more insight on the 
former. If the findings here are corroborated, it may suggest that any reward-based intervention 
should be administered intermittently to maintain its effect over time. The latter suggests that 
rewards that excite students should be chosen for maximum effect and that there should be 
variation in the types of rewards available so as to maintain children’s interest in them. To the 
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extent that the negative trend observed in the intervention effect is a byproduct of children losing 
interest in the incentives being offered, then the introduction of new prizes at optimal intervals 
may have an offsetting effect, thereby potentially facilitating the continuous provision of 
rewards. Future research is therefore also needed to ascertain the types of prizes likely to elicit 
the greatest response and the requisite variation necessary to maintain interest.  
 As for the evidence pertaining to “ripple” effects, the findings presented here are likely 
not definitive. Although the survey results suggest that there may be no external effects related to 
the introduction of reward-based incentives in school or school-like settings, the response rate 
and the lack of a second measure to corroborate the accuracy of the responses leave much to be 
desired. Further research is therefore necessary to assess the effect of rewards-based incentives 
outside of intervention-settings. 
With that said, the presence of negative “ripple” effects may be less of a concern among 
children from low-income families, as studies suggest that such children consume fewer fruits 
and vegetables at home (Krebs-Smith et al. 1996; Munoz et al. 1997). Anecdotal evidence 
collected as part of conversations with various staff members and non-staff familiar with the 
community that the site served also suggest that the children in this study—nearly all of whom 
were from low-income households—did not consume many fruits and vegetables at home, if any 
healthy food at all.  
Finally, given this study’s sample selection process and size, the generalizability of the 
results presented here are limited. Nevertheless, by adding yet another context in which 
remunerative interventions have been tested, the results of this study together with those of 
others bolsters the case for their efficacy among young children and provides suggestive 
evidence for the absence of any adverse “ripple” effects. Furthermore, the study population is 
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one of particular interest since low-income children are likely to benefit the most from 
interventions targeting their dietary behaviors.  
Conclusions 
 
Corroborating existing studies, the introduction of small reward-based incentives were 
found to increase the number of children choosing the healthy dessert options after lunch but 
disaggregating the results by week and days suggests that their impact may diminish over time. 
Attempts to ascertain their effect outside of experimental settings did not indicate that the 
introduction of rewards had any adverse effects, but also did not provide definitive results. 
Consequently, further research is needed in this regard. There is also a greater need for long-term 
studies, not only to assess the temporal effects of reward-based interventions but also habit 
formation. If children were to develop a habit for healthier eating behaviors within intervention 
settings, this may then translate to better dietary choices in other environments as well. 
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Tables & Figures 
Figure 8. Proportion Choosing Fruits – Between Weeks 
 
Note: This table depicts the change in dessert choice among participants who chose a dessert, averaged 
























































Figure 9. Proportion Choosing Fruits – Within Weeks 
 
Note: This graph depicts within-week changes in the proportion of participants choosing fruits. The first 


































































Table 9. Descriptive Statistics 
Characteristics Frequency Percent of Total 
 
AGE 
   5 
   6 
   7 















   Female 









   Black 
   White 
   Mixed (Black & White) 
   Other 
 
Ethnicity 
   Hispanic 





















   Single Mother 
   Both Parents 











   <10,000 
   10,001 – 20,000 
   20,001 – 30,000 












Number of Siblings 
   0 
   1 
   2 
   3 














Free Lunch 23 100% 
Note: This table provides socioeconomic and demographic information for participating children. The 







Table 10. Consumption and Prize Selection 
 Consumption (Weeks 1 – 4)  
 ¼ Cup ½ Cup ¾ Cup All Total 
      
Amount 
Consumed 
2 2 12 332 348† 
Proportion 0.57% 0.57% 3.45% 95.40% 100% 
 
 Prize Selection (Weeks 2 & 3)  
 Pencil 
Sharpeners 





         
Proportion 3.42% 2.48% 2.48% 3.12% 11.49% 33.54% 43.48% 100%‡ 
         
Note: The top panel depicts consumption of fruits and cookies throughout the experiment and the bottom 
panel depicts prize selection in weeks 2 and 3. The total number of prizes ordered were as follows: 72 
pencil sharpeners,72 pamphlets, 144 plastic rings, 100 pencils, 72 gliders, 144 rubber balls, and 140 
finger lights. † Of 358 decisions, 349 resulted in the choice of a dessert. However, total consumption 
observations sum to 348 as one child dropped their fruit cup and did not ask for it to be replenished. This 
child had dropped the contents of their chosen dessert cups several times during the duration of the 
experiment but had asked for it to be replenished each time, with this time being the sole exception. ‡ 





















Table 11. Intervention and Post-Intervention Effects 









     
Intervention 2.090*** 0.372***   
 (0.410) (0.0732)   
 [1.287, 2.894] [.229, .516]   
     
Post-Intervention   -2.507*** -0.429*** 
   (0.471) (0.0768) 
   [-3.429, -1.585] [-.579, -.279] 
     
Constant  -0.196***  0.209*** 
  (0.0549)  (0.0236) 
  [-.303, -.088]  [.163, .255] 
     
Observations 257 275 264 266 
Note: Models (1) & (3) are logistic models with fixed-effects and clustered standard errors (both at the 
individual level); Models (2) & (4) are linear probability models with fixed-effects and clustered standard 
errors (both at the individual level). Standard errors in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals in brackets; * p 


























Week 1 (Omitted) Week Effects Day Effects 
Week 2 0.451***  
 (0.0734)  
 [.307, .595]  
   
Week 3 0.283**  
 (0.0885)  
 [.109, .457]  
   
Week 2 – first half  0.494*** 
  (0.0860) 
  [.325, .662] 
   
Week 2 – second half  0.387*** 
  (0.0845) 
  [.222, .553] 
   
Week 3 – first half  0.296** 
  (0.0920) 
  [.115, .476] 
   
Week 3 – second half  0.264* 
  (0.114) 
  [.039, .488] 
   
Constant -0.199*** -0.198*** 
 (0.0544) (0.0545) 
 [-.305, -.092] [-.305, -.091] 
   
Observations 275 275 
Note: Model’s (1) & (2) are linear probability models with fixed-effects and clustered standard errors 
(both at the individual level). The baseline week is omitted in model (1) and, similarly, the baseline days 
are omitted in model (2). Standard errors in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals in brackets; * p < 0.05, 








Figure A1. Survey Questions 
 
 
These questions were adapted form the Child Eating Behavior Inventory (CEBI), a parent-report instrument 
designed to assess childhood eating and mealtime problems. These questions were adapted in the following 
way: 
1. Question 7 of CEBI: “My child enjoys eating” 
a. Adapted to read: “My child enjoys eating fruits” 
 
2. Question 8 of CEBI: “My child asks for food which he/she shouldn’t have” 
Question 25 of CEBI: “My child asks for food between meals” 
a. Adapted to read: “My child asks for fruits” 
 
3. Question 9 of CEBI: “My child feeds him/her self as expected for his/her age” 
a. Adapted to read: “My child feeds him/her-self fruits” 
 
4. Question 11 of CEBI: “I feel confident my child eats enough” 
a. Adapted to read: “I feel confident my child eats enough fruits” 
 
5. Question 25 of CEBI: “My child asks for food between meals” 
a. Adapted to read: “My child asks for fruits between meals” 
 
6. Question 17 of CEBI: “My child eats quickly” 
Question 27 of CEBI: “My child eats chunky food” 




Figure A2. Dessert Combinations 
 Dessert Combination  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Week 1†          
 Mon. (7/11) X         
 Tues. (7/12) X         
 Wed. (7/13) X         
 Thurs. (7/14)  X        
 Fri. (7/15) X         
Week 2*           
 Mon. (7/18)   X       
 Tues. (7/19)    X      
 Wed. (7/20)     X     
 Thurs. (7/21)      X    
 Fri. (7/22)  X        
Week 3*           
 Mon. (7/25)       X   
 Tues. (7/26)        X  
 Wed. (7/27)     X     
 Thurs. (7/28)    X      
 Fri. (7/29)   X       
Week 4‡          
 Mon. (8/1)  X     X   
 Tues. (8/2)          
 Wed. (8/3)      X    
 Thurs. (8/4) X         
 Fri. (8/5)        X  
Notes: Dessert combinations are as follows: (1) Apples, bananas, purple grapes, and chocolate chip 
cookies; (2) Apples, bananas, green grapes, and chocolate chip cookies; (3) Pears, bananas, purple grapes, 
and chocolate chip cookies; (4) Apples, bananas, green grapes and Oreo cookies; (5) Apples, bananas, 
purple grapes, and Oreo cookies; (6) Pears, green grapes, purple grapes, and chocolate chip cookies; (7) 
Pears, purple grapes, bananas, and Oreo cookies; (8) Pears, green grapes, bananas, and chocolate chip 
cookies. 
† Baseline week 
* Intervention Week 
‡ Post-intervention week  
 
Additional Information: Each fruit cup contained roughly four diced pieces of an apple or pear, five 
grapes, and four pieces of banana, in that order (~85 grams). Each cookie cup consisted of one and a half 
cookies (if chocolate chip) or two cookies (if Oreos). That the fruit cups may appear more full than the 
cookie cups may be a potential source of bias. Some children may have, for example, preferred the cookie 
cups for dessert simply because they are satiated and do not wish to eat a lot for dessert. This would be a 
source of downward bias for the effect of the intervention. On the other hand, children may wish to 
choose the cup they believe offers the most food. If so, then this would bias the results upwards. It’s hard 




just having eaten lunch, it’s unlikely that they are still so hungry that they would choose fruit cups simply 
because they contain more food. In fact, children were sometimes able to get a second serving of lunch if 
they so desired, and some did. The inclusion of a baseline observation week in the analysis should, 




















Table A20. Comparison of Coefficients 
  Week 2 Week 3 
 Week 2 1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half 
      
Week 1 .017 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Week 2      
  1st half ̶ ̶ 0.231 0.035 0.051 
  2nd half ̶ ̶ ̶ 0.107 0.282 
Week 3      
  1st half ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 0.749 
  2nd half ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
      
Note: These p-values correspond to tests of equality between the coefficients in Table 4. t-tests were used 
to compare differences in coefficients for statistical significance and the p-values are reported. The first 
half of each week is comprised of Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. The second half is comprised of 




Table A21. Robustness Check: Attendance 









     
Intervention 0.365***    
 (0.0746)    
     
Post-Intervention  -0.429***   
  (0.0768)   
     
Week 2   0.454***  
   (0.0762)  
     
Week 3   0.275**  
   (0.0895)  
     
1st half of Week 2    0.476*** 
    (0.0881) 
     
2nd half of Week 2    0.373*** 
    (0.0911) 
     
1st half of Week 3    0.282** 
    (0.0985) 
     
2nd half of Week 3    0.254* 
    (0.116) 
     
Constant -0.190*** 0.209*** -0.198*** -0.187** 
 (0.0560) (0.0236) (0.0559) (0.0579) 
Observations 267 263 264 252 
Note: Columns 1 through 4 present the results from linear probability models with fixed-effects and 
clustered standard errors (both at the individual level). The sample is restricted so that each individual 
attends at least once in any given period of interest and therefore contributes to the analysis. Coefficients 





Table A22. Robustness Check: Alternative Days 
 (1) 
 Day Effects 
  
Week 2 – first half 0.500*** 
 (0.0955) 
  
Week 2 – second half 0.416*** 
 (0.0767) 
  
Week 3 – first half 0.389*** 
 (0.0972) 
  







Note: These are the results from a linear probability model with fixed-effects and clustered standard errors 
(both at the individual level). The baseline days are omitted. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** 
p <0.01,***p<0.001.  
 
 
Table A23. Comparison of Coefficients 
  Week 2 Week 3 
 Week 2 1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half 
      
Week 2      
  1st half ̶ ̶ 0.321 0.311 0.006 
  2nd half ̶ ̶ ̶ 0.691 0.017 
Week 3      
  1st half ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 0.043 
  2nd half ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
      
Note: These p-values correspond to tests of equality between the coefficients in Table A3. t-tests were 
used to compare differences in coefficients for statistical significance and the p-values are reported. The 
first half of each week is comprised of Monday and Tuesday. The second half is comprised of 







Table A24. Robustness Check: Excluding Children with Parents on Site 
 Treatment Effect Removal of Treatment 
Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Intervention 2.343*** 0.386***   
 (0.430) (0.0765)   
     
Post-Intervention   -2.763*** -0.437*** 
   (0.587) (0.0895) 
     
Constant  -0.206***  0.211*** 
  (0.0573)  (0.0275) 
Observations 214 232 223 225 
Note: Model’s (1) & (3) are conditional logit with fixed-effects and clustered standard errors (both at the 
individual level); Model’s (2) & (4) are linear probability models with fixed-effects and clustered 
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Think of the Children? The Effect of Children on Public Support for the Supplemental 




Public opinion of government programs is often group-centric in that it is shaped by 
attitudes towards the social or demographic groups perceived to be their beneficiaries (Nelson & 
Kinder, 1996; Converse, 2006; Winter, 2008). This is particularly true for welfare programs, 
which are highly politicized and racialized and often the target of reforms that limit their scope 
and coverage. Motivating these reforms are perceptions of benefits recipients as undeserving of 
aid—predicated on the idea that many are able to work but choose not to—and (or) the 
association of welfare with black Americans (e.g., Gamson & Lasch, 1983; Gilens, 1999). The 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the largest food assistance program in the 
United States, is no exception (Goren, 2008). 
Growth in caseloads and costs in the decades since welfare reform have once again made 
the program a subject of scrutiny (Dickert-Conlin et al., 2016). At the federal level, the Trump 
administration seeks to cut spending on SNAP by $230 billion over ten years by restricting 
eligibility, raising administrative burdens, imposing more stringent program rules, reducing 
benefits, and limiting access to food (Rosenbaum & Nuerberger, 2020).40 If adopted, these 
proposals would deny or reduce benefits to millions of adults as well as millions of children, who 
make up 44 percent of all SNAP beneficiaries (Cronquist, 2019; Rosenbaum & Nuerberger, 
 
40 Sonny Purdue, the United States Secretary of Agriculture under the Trump administration and head of the United 
States Department of Agriculture, which administers SNAP, has referenced the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (colloquially referred to as “welfare reform”) and arguments motivating its 





2020).41  This despite evidence that current benefits are exhausted quickly upon receipt, forcing 
many households to reduce their caloric intake towards the end of their benefits cycle  (Shapiro, 
2005; Todd, 2015; Smith et al., 2016). 
To the extent that attitudes towards SNAP are group-centric and rooted in misconceptions 
about the composition of its beneficiaries, highlighting the children it serves may make the 
program more appealing to the public and politically sustainable. Highlighting the child 
beneficiaries of the program—who presumably cannot be underserving of aid and draw more 
empathy than adults—may induce greater support for it (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). 
Alternatively, however, an emphasis on children may be “self-undermining” (e.g. Levine, 2015) 
if it evokes thoughts of irresponsible parenting or out of wedlock births, thereby reinforcing 
existing stereotypes or creating new ones, leading to a reduction in expressed support for the 
program or no change at all.  Whether accentuating children might alter support for SNAP is 
therefore an empirical question. 
This study investigates whether highlighting the child beneficiaries of SNAP can increase 
support for the program and overcome racial antipathies using a large-scale survey experiment. I 
first examine whether any frame evoking children—with and without imagery and regardless of 
their race—is effective. I then investigate whether this effect varies by the type of frame used. 
More specifically, I test whether imagery of children moderates the effect of simply mentioning 
children, and whether the race of the children shown matters. I also examine differential 
responsiveness to these frames across participants from politically influential social and 
demographic groups. In several extensions, I explore whether these frames can alter how 
strongly participants feel about their position on the program and their underlying motivations. I 
 
41 These reforms may also have the secondary effect of depriving hundreds of thousands of children access to free and 




also assess the generalizability of these effects to another welfare program, the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which provides cash assistance to families with children. 
This study makes three important contributions. First, while the literature on the political 
and racial determinants of support for welfare programs is extensive, much less is known about 
the conditions under which these programs may become “de-politicized” or “de-racialized” 
(Winter, 2006). This study helps to fill this gap in the literature. In so doing, it also expands on 
the group-centric model of public opinion by considering how different characteristics of a 
group—in this case age and race—interact with deservingness to shape perceptions. Lastly, it 
presents evidence that black children may not induce the same level of empathy among some 
demographic and social groups as compared to white children. 
To preview the main results, I find that highlighting the child beneficiaries of SNAP 
induces greater support for the program overall, and that this effect is smaller when children are 
characterized as black as compared to white. I also find that support increases among whites and 
Republicans, and high- and middle-income households, though, again, less so when the child 
beneficiaries are characterized as black. Only when race is not primed, or when children are 
characterized as white or diverse, is support for TANF increased. In sum, while highlighting 
children likely taps into ideas of deservingness that boost support for SNAP and TANF, these 
beliefs are tempered by attitudes towards blacks. 
Background on SNAP  
 
In 2019, SNAP provided $56 billion in benefits to nearly 36 million Americans. Though 
the primary aim of the program is to reduce food insecurity—defined as the lack of reliable 




and an “automatic stabilizer” during economic downturns (Tiehen, Jolliffe, & Smeeding, 2015; 
Blinder & Zandi, 2015; Keith-Jennings & Rosenbaum, 2015).  
According to federal guidelines for SNAP, eligibility for the program requires that 
household income not exceed 130% of the federal poverty level (FPL) and net income (gross 
income less certain deductions) not exceed 100% of the FPL, as well as satisfying two asset tests.  
Benefits are determined by subtracting 30% of net income from the maximum benefit 
guaranteed, which varies by household size, and are distributed via a debit card system known as 
Electronic Benefits Transfer. These benefits can only be used to purchase select foods at 
authorized retailers. Beginning in the late 1990s and accelerating in the 2000s, states have been 
afforded discretion over many aspects of the program’s implementation, and can relax eligibility 
criteria, increase benefits generosity, and waive restrictions on the types of foods that can be 
purchased with benefits.42 States are also responsible for setting the program’s rules, outreach 
efforts, and sanctioning policies (Gabor et al., 2003).43,44 
Additionally, ten states further delegate implementation of SNAP to county governments.  
Although counties in these states are required to comply with specific federal or state mandates, 
they are afforded considerable flexibility in implementing the program otherwise (National 
Association of Counties, 2019). Street-level bureaucrats, such as case workers in local offices, 
can also influence program outcomes by implementing the programs in ways that may encourage 
or deter participation among prospective or current beneficiaries. For example, workers in local 
offices can deter participation by creating an unwelcoming or stigmatizing atmosphere, 
 
42 Though benefits generosity can be increased by adding to allowable deductions in the calculation of net income, 
doing so does not significantly lower net income and benefits levels do not vary substantially across states. 
43 These practices can include whether and what kind of information is disseminated about the program, whether or 
not applicants can apply online, unannounced home visits to detect fraud,  how often households need to recertify, 
and the kind of sanctions that are imposed on households who fail to meet the program’s requirements. 




dedicating less time and fewer resources to outreach, or exerting little effort in guiding 
prospective beneficiaries through the application process (Lopez-Landin, 2013; Kogan, 2017). 
The devolution of the program has produced a wide array of eligibility criteria and 
program rules that have contributed to large differences in participation rates among eligible 
households across and within states (Kogan, 2017; Call & Shimada, 2018; Cunnyngham, 2019). 
The lack of uniformity in the implementation of SNAP has implications for social equity and 
economic inequality, expanding its reach and impact in some contexts while limiting them in 
others (Dickert-Conlin, et al., 2016; Shaw, 2009). In fact, participation rates have been found to 
be lower and application denial rates higher in jurisdictions with higher minority populations and 
where support for redistributive government policies is lower (Kogan, 2017). Consequently, a 
black household with children is more likely than a similar white household to live in a state or 
county with more stringent eligibility criteria and program rules that might impede their access to 
benefits.  
To the extent that local political and social considerations reflect misconceptions about 
SNAP beneficiaries and manifest in state and local policies through elected officials and 
bureaucrats, adjusting these perceptions may bolster support for the programs and help to 
minimize or eliminate disparities in its implementation. 
Theoretical Framework and Relevant Literature 
 
 Public opinion influences policy through elected and appointed officials (Burstein, 2003; 
Stimson, 2004). State and local lawmakers and bureaucrats may be responsive to their political 
and social contexts for several reasons. First, they may be subject to political processes (e.g., 
elections or referrals) that require them to adhere to the policy preferences of their electorate. 




wealthier residents) may constrain their behavior. Third, as members of the communities they 
live or work in, they likely share the same preferences and attitudes as those of the majority in 
their jurisdiction.  
Public opinion can, in turn, be influenced by how those policies are presented, or framed 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007). Government programs are often framed in ways that shape public 
perceptions of the issues they are meant to address, thereby influencing attitudes towards the 
policies themselves.45 These frames serve as heuristics that help individuals conceptualize 
complex issues (e.g., poverty), suggest explanations for them (e.g. who bears responsibility), 
standards for judging them (e.g. their consequences), and viable solutions (e.g. government 
intervention) (Nelson & Kinder, 1996). 
 The effects of framing are particularly apparent with respect to welfare programs. 
Although Americans consistently express support for greater assistance to the poor when asked 
in abstract terms, many also consistently oppose government spending on aid to the poor when 
questions about assistance are framed in terms of specific policies (Rasinski, 1989; Green & 
Kern, 2012; Berinsky et al., 2012). The lack of support for welfare programs has been attributed 
to racial bias against their presumed recipients and, more generally, perceptions of their 
beneficiaries as undeserving of government aid.  
In their study cataloging frames associated with welfare in the 1960s and 1970s, Gamson 
& Lasch (1983) identified the “freeloader frame”—which advances the notion that many of the 
poor are simply taking advantage of government assistance programs—as particularly pervasive. 
This frame is also closely linked to racial attitudes towards blacks. As documented in detail in 
 
45 Framing effects have been shown to alter support for Social Security (Winter, 2006), school vouchers (Brewer & 
Gross, 2005), affirmative action (Kinder & Sanders, 1990), and government spending (Jacoby, 2000), among many 




Gilens (1999), decades of negative media coverage of poverty associated welfare, and its abuse, 
with blacks lacking in work ethic.46 In fact, the relationship between opinions on welfare and 
attitudes towards blacks is so strong as to suggest the two are nearly synonymous: mentioning 
welfare, even absent any racial cues, elicits thoughts of blacks and their “moral failings.” 
Research has consistently found antipathy towards blacks to be among the most important 
determinants of weak support for welfare programs (Jacoby, 2000; Winter, 2006; Goren, 2008; 
Ellis & Faricy, 2019). A separate strand of literature finds that states in which blacks constitute a 
larger share of welfare caseloads have narrower eligibility criteria, more stringent program rules, 
and less generous benefits (Soss et al., 2001; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004). 
Public opinion on government programs is often group-centric in that it is influenced by 
attitudes citizens possess toward the social or demographic groups perceived to be their 
beneficiaries (Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Converse, 2006; Winter, 2008). Group-centric thinking is 
not immutable, however. Just as public opinion has been conditioned by decades of media 
coverage and political discourse to associate welfare programs with the undeserving, blacks, or 
both, these same programs can be re-framed in ways that divert attention away from these groups 
or accentuate other groups perceived as more deserving, thereby shifting opinion in favor of such 
programs. Children, as among the main beneficiaries of welfare programs, may serve as one such 
group, though studies evaluating the efficacy of frames using children are scarce, outdated, and 
produce mixed results.47 
 
46 Welfare is not as strongly associated with other minority groups. Whites generally have a far more favorable 
opinion of Asians (who are often stereotyped as a “model minority”) and Hispanics as compared to blacks, Studies 
examining the link between attitudes towards Hispanics and support for, or implementation of, welfare programs 
have found mixed or null results (Soss et al., 2001; Schram et al., 2009; Hussey & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013). In 
contrast, support for welfare programs and their implementation has consistently been linked to attitudes about 
blacks. For this reason, this study focuses primarily on whites and blacks, rather than Hispanics or Asians. 
47 Using the typology developed by Schneider and Ingram (1993), perceptions of “dependents,” like children, are 




In a lab experiment, Iyengar (1990) finds that while participants exposed to a treatment 
mimicking news coverage of children affected by poverty expressed more sympathy than those 
in a similar treatment using adults, the mostly white participants expressed less sympathy when 
the coverage involved black children as compared to white children. Supplementing these results 
with data from a nationally representative survey, Iyengar (1990) also found greater support for 
families described as having larger numbers of children, though the vignettes used did not vary 
descriptions of the families by race.  
In another lab experiment, Nelson and Oxley (1999) tested support for a family cap 
limiting welfare benefits for families with children across groups of participants exposed to an 
article emphasizing the potential consequences it would have for child poverty together with a 
picture of a black boy and an article emphasizing the importance of personal responsibility and 
the need to disincentivize child birth among those who could not support their families together 
with a  picture of a black woman and four children. Although no difference was found between 
the two groups in their support for the family cap, those presented with the picture of the child 
were more likely to believe in the importance of protecting poor children.  
This study updates and improves upon this literature. In addition to the mixed findings of 
these previous studies, decades of social, economic, and political developments leave the 
question of whether framing welfare programs as benefiting children can alter public support for 
them unresolved.48 I improve on previous work by conducting a survey experiment using a larger 
and more diverse sample as opposed to a lab experiment relying on small samples made up of 
local white (or predominantly white) volunteers. The use of a survey experiment has the added 
 
48 One particularly noteworthy development has been the treatment of undocumented children crossing into the 





advantage of testing frames in the real-world settings in which individuals formulate their 
opinions, and my more diverse sample allows for heterogeneity analysis across participants from 
diverse backgrounds. Additionally, this study extends the literature in several ways.  
Nelson and Kinder (1996) find that the addition of an image to a frame can have a 
substantial impact on its efficacy. I assess the moderating effect that imagery of children can 
have on a frame only mentioning children. They also show that group-centric thinking can be 
shaped by multiple features of a single target group in ways that may compound or counteract 
each other. I therefore also explore the interaction of age and race with perceived deservingness. 
While children may be considered more deserving in general, their characterization as black may 
evoke negative stereotypes that negate perceptions of their deservingness. In contrast, white 
children may evoke positive stereotypes that raises perceptions of their deservingness. 
Existing research also finds consistent links between being white, high income, or 
politically conservative with lower support for cash and food assistance (e.g., Jacoby, 2000; Soss 
et al., 2001; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Winter, 2006). I leverage the diversity of my sample to 
investigate how framing SNAP as benefiting children can boost support for the program across 
these politically influential groups. Going beyond gauging changes in support for SNAP, I also 
document how different frames highlighting children affect the motivations underlying expressed 
preferences. Specifically, I track changes in beliefs commonly tied to support for welfare, 
including deservingness, egalitarianism, and attitudes towards government (Ellis & Faricy, 
2019). 
Finally, I explore the efficacy of a frame highlighting children in the context of TANF.49 
Unlike SNAP, which provides benefits that can only be used for the purchase of food, TANF 
 
49 The aims of TANF include the provision of aid to needy families with children, promoting employment, 




provides cash-assistance. States also have far more discretion in implementing TANF, resulting 
in even starker differences in participation rates and benefits levels across the country that 
reinforce social inequity and economic inequality (Floyd, 2020; Thompson, 2018). How 
programs are designed can also influence public opinion, and direct cash payments are 
particularly unpopular (Shaw, 2009; Ellis & Faricy, 2019). As such, effects may vary across the 
two programs.  
A priori, relative to no mention or imagery of children, I expect that frames highlighting 
children will induce greater support for SNAP, that the use of imagery will boost this effect, and 
that induced support will be lower when children are characterized as black as compared to 
white. I also expect whites, Republicans, and those from middle- and high-income household to 
be responsive, though less responsive than their black, Democrat, and low-income counterparts. I 
have no a prior expectations as to how effects might vary across SNAP and TANF. 
Experimental Design, Data, and Sample 
Experimental Design 
 
I employ a survey experiment in which participants are randomized into a control 
condition or one of four treatment conditions. A randomized survey experiment is ideal as it 
allows for an evaluation of the causal impact of the treatments as they might be employed in real 
world settings. In each condition, participants are presented nine statements pertaining to the 
spending activities of various organizations, including governments, non-profits, and for-profit 
 
expenditures amounted to $31.3 billion in 2018, only $6.7 billion of which was dedicated to cash assistance. federal 
guidelines only require that benefits receipt be tied to work activities, and that states not provide cash assistance 
from federal funds to families that include an adult recipient for longer than 60 months (with some exceptions) and 
to legal immigrants who have not lived in the country for at least five years. Illegal immigrants are barred from any 
assistance through either federal or state TANF funds. Otherwise, states can choose what services to provide and can 
set their own eligibility criteria, outreach efforts, program rules, sanctioning policies, and benefits levels. The overall 
effect of devolution on cash assistance has been particularly stark. Participation rates vary from 4 percent in 
Louisiana to 68 percent in California (Floyd, 2020), and benefits vary from $170 per month for a family of three 




businesses. In the order that they appear in the survey, these are the state government of 
California (California), Johnson & Johnson (J&J), the federal government (for SNAP), Susan G. 
Komen (Komen), Amazon, government of New York City (NYC), Walmart, the National 
Football League (NFL), and state and federal governments (for TANF). After being presented 
with a statement, participants are asked whether they think spending on the specified activity 
should be increased, decreased, or remain unchanged, how strongly they feel about their 
spending preference, and the reasons motivating their choice. Asking about spending preferences 
in this way is frequently used to gauge support for government programs and taps into general 
sentiments about them (Stimson, 2004; Winter, 2006). The survey concludes with an attention 
check question followed by a questionnaire collecting data on participant’s socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics.50 
Participants in all conditions are presented the same set of statements, the exceptions 
being those pertaining to SNAP and TANF, which are altered to mention children in the 
treatment conditions. These statements are shown in Figure 10. In the Control condition, 
participants are provided a statement that explains what SNAP and TANF are and how much 
they cost with no mention of the children served by the programs.51 In the first treatment 
condition, Text Only (TO), both statements are altered to mention children. Participants in the 
remaining three conditions are presented the same statements as those in the Text Only condition 
together with an image.  
 
50 The attention check questions present a statement about a for-profit company’s spending on an activity but also 
instructs participants to ignore the statement and select “remain unchanged.” 
51 This is commonly how public opinion polls ask such questions. For example, from a 2018 Politico-Harvard poll: 
“Another part of the US Farm Bill is support for SNAP, the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program, formerly 
known as food stamps. This program provides government-supported food purchasing assistance to millions of low-
income people in the US. In the new Farm Bill, do you think federal spending on the SNAP or food stamp program 




These images are shown in Figure 11 The images accompanying the SNAP and TANF 
statements for those in the Text & Diverse Image (TDI) condition show children of varying racial 
and ethnic backgrounds so as to avoid contaminating this condition with the race-specific images 
those in the Text & Black Image (TBI) and Text & White Image (TWI) are exposed to. The 
images accompanying the SNAP statement in the latter two treatment conditions depict a black 
and white boy-girl pair, respectively. As three quarters of all child beneficiaries of SNAP are 
below the age of eleven, the images were chosen so as to depict young children.52,53 While the 
TANF statements in the Text & Black Image and Text & White Image conditions are 
accompanied by the same racially and ethnically diverse image that appears in the Text & 
Diverse Image condition, the racial framing is primed by the race-based images accompanying 
the preceding SNAP statement. In other words, given the sequence in which statements appear, 
participants in the image treatments are exposed to a single image when asked about spending on 
SNAP, and two images when asked about spending on TANF (the earlier SNAP image as well as 
the TANF image). 
After participants indicate their preferred spending position in response to each statement, 
a follow-up question asks them to indicate how strongly they feel about their position by 
choosing a number on a continuous scale that ranges from 0 (“Not that strongly”) to 3 (“Very 
strongly”).54 Depending on their spending preference (increase, decrease, or remain unchanged), 
they are then presented with a list of reasons that may have motivated their position, covering 
the: (1) assistance beneficiaries of an activity are receiving, (2) extent of an entity’s involvement 
 
52 In 2018, 29.4% of child beneficiaries of SNAP were between 0-4 years old, 17.9% were between 5-7, 24.3% were 
between 8-11, and 19.9% were between 12-15 years (Cronquist, 2019). 
53 These images were shown to 100 participants in a separate survey conducted using Lucid. Participants were asked 
to indicate what age they believed the children in the images to be. The average age for the SNAP images were 5.6, 
7.6, and 8.9  across the Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image conditions, 
respectively. The average age for the TANF image was 9.6. 




an activity, (3) use of resources for an activity, (4) desirability of an activity, (5) and an entity’s 
wastefulness in performing the activity. For each reason, they are asked to specify a number on a 
continuous scale ranging from 0 (“Not important”) to 3 (“Very important”).55 These are 
presented in Figure 12.  In the context of SNAP and TANF, these motivations are used to 
capture beliefs about deservingness (1), government involvement (2), egalitarianism (3 & 4), and 
government efficiency (5). 
To mask the objective of the experiment, the SNAP and TANF statements are embedded 
among statements covering other activities carried out by various organizations that are all 
charitable in nature and which benefit individuals. These statements are also accompanied by 
images in the treatment conditions involving imagery. The images associated with each 
statement were chosen to be relevant to the activity specified, and are shown in Figure A3 of the 
Appendix.  
In order to minimize any priming or anchoring effects, participants are first exposed to 
two statements covering the activities of a state government (California) and a for-profit firm 
(Johnson & Johnson) and two varying levels of expenditures ($75 billion and $9 billion, 
respectively) so as to assuage suspicions that the experiment is intended to gauge support for 
government spending on a particular program and avoid having respondents base their 
evaluations relative to the lower or higher spending levels of other organizations. Participants are 
then presented the statement pertaining to SNAP. The survey then continues with five more 
statements covering the activities and expenditures of other entities, with the statement about 










 The survey experiment was administered by Lucid between February 20th and March 6th 
of 2020 and involved 3,878 participants. Lucid recruits adult  participants from a large and 
diverse pool of respondents and uses a quota sampling procedure to construct samples 
demographically similar to the general population as reflected in the United States Census across 
age gender, ethnicity, and region.56  Samples collected using Lucid have been shown to closely 
mirror probability-based samples of the broader population and have been used to successfully 
replicate survey experiments relying on both convenience and probability-based samples 
(Coppock and McClellan, 2019).57 
As mentioned above, all participants were asked questions pertaining to their 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, including their gender, age, race, ethnicity, 
household income, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment status, utilization of 
social assistance programs, political party affiliation, and political ideology. This information 
was supplemented with data collected by Lucid on educational attainment and region of 
residence.58  
I used this information to create a set of indicator variables for whether a participant: is 
female; is young, middle aged, or elderly; is Hispanic, white (white), black (black), or other 
 
56 See Coppock and McClellan (2019) for additional details about Lucid and its sampling procedure. 
57 Lucid offers several advantages over Amazon’s MTurk services, which has been widely used to test social 
scientific experiments (until recently, Lucid catered primarily to market research firms). First, Lucid taps into a 
larger and more diverse pool of respondents. Second, samples collected using Lucid better reflect the demographic, 
political, and psychological profiles of the general population.  Third, critics argue that MTurk samples include 
respondents that are “overfished,” “professionalized,” and potentially fraudulent (e.g., bots).   In contrast, 375,000 
unique respondents pass through Lucid’s “marketplace” each day and there has been no evidence of fraudulent 
responses to date. 
58 Lucid also provides data on respondents gender, age, race, ethnicity, household income, and political party 
affiliation. Comparing the data on these characteristics provided by Lucid to those collected as part of the survey 
reveals few discrepancies. Whenever possible, I use the variables collected as part of the survey in my analysis as 
they are more comprehensive. As a robustness check, I use the data provided by Lucid. Results are substantively 




(Asian, Native American, or Pacific Islander); has a bachelor’s degree or higher; comes from a 
low, middle, or high income household; was born in the United States; is married; is a parent; is 
employed; is on social assistance; is a Democrat (dem), Republican (repub), or 
Independent/other (Green Party, Libertarian Party, or other); is liberal, conservative, or 
moderate; or resides in the South, Northeast, Midwest, or West. I also create variables for 
whether a participant is non-white (nonwhite), non-black (nonblack), non-Republican 
(nonrepub), and non-Democrat (nondem), and non-high- (nonhighinc), non-middle- 
(nonmiddleinc), and non-low income (nonlowinc). 
My key measures of interest include a set of binary variables indicating whether a 
participant was assigned to the Control, Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, 
or Text & White Image condition. These variables take a value of 1 if the participant was 
assigned to the condition and 0 otherwise. Similarly, I create two additional binary variables 
indicating assignment to any of the treatment conditions (AnyTreat) and any of the image 
treatment conditions (AnyImageTreat). My primary outcome measure, Increase SNAP, captures 
support for SNAP and takes a value of 1 if a participant indicated a preference for increased 
spending on the program and 0 if their preference was for spending to remain unchanged or be 
decreased. I also create two alternative sets of outcome measures. To gauge shifts in preferences 
away from decreased spending and allow for a more expansive definition of support, Increase or 
No Change SNAP takes a value of 1 if a participant preferred spending to remain unchanged or 
be increased, and 0 otherwise. The second is a categorical variable, Spending SNAP, that takes a 




respectively. I create variables Increase TANF, Increase or No Change TANF, and Spending 
TANF similarly to capture support for TANF.59 
To represent how strongly participants feel about their indicated spending preference, I 
create continuous variables Strength SNAP and Strength TANF ranging from 0 (“Not that 
strongly”) to 3 (“Very strongly”). I create continuous variables corresponding to each of the 
reasons that may have motivated participants’ chosen spending preferences similarly. These are 
Assistance, Involvement, Resources, Desirability, and Wastefulness. Finally, I create a set of 
indicator variables capturing preferences for increased spending on activities carried out by the 
other entities included in the survey. These include California, J&J, Komen, Amazon, NYC, 
Walmart, and NFL, and take a value of 1 if participants indicated a preference for increased 




 The analytic sample includes 3,106 that passed the attention check embedded in the 
survey. Column 1 of Table 13 presents summary statistics for this sample. The majority of 
respondents are between the ages of 35 and 64. A majority also report having children, 
household incomes between $25,000 and $74,999, being female, and being employed. The 
sample is ethnically and racially diverse, with 13 percent being Hispanic, 74 percent white, 12 
percent black, and 14 percent “other” (Asian, Native American, or Pacific Islander).60 A third of 
the sample has a bachelor’s degree or higher, 44 percent are married, and 26 percent report 
 
59 It should be noted that it is possible for a participant to support SNAP or TANF but also believe that existing 
spending levels on the programs are adequate or perhaps higher than what is optimal. If so, they may express a 
preference for spending on the programs to remain unchanged or be decreased and the Increase SNAP and Increase 
TANF measures will underestimate the extent of support. This problem is somewhat ameliorated by the more 
expansive Increase or No Change SNAP and Increase or No Change TANF measures. These measures are not likely 
to result in an overestimation of support, however, as it is unlikely that a participant opposing the programs would 
prefer for their spending to be increased or remain unchanged. 




receiving some social assistance (e.g., unemployment insurance). Nearly the entire sample 
reports being born in the United States. With regards to political party affiliation, a plurality of 
the sample identifies as Democrat, with equal shares identifying as Republican and independent 
or other (Libertarian Party or Green Party). Ideologically, the sample is roughly divided equally 
across liberal, conservative, and moderate. 
For comparison with the analytic sample, columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 13 present 
profiles of the general population as captured by the American Community Survey (ACS) for 
2017, the General Social Survey (GSS) for 2018, and Gallup for February 2020.61 Along most 
dimensions, the analytic sample appears very similar to either the ACS sample, the GSS sample, 
or both, even across characteristics that are not used by Lucid in its quota sampling procedure as 
seen in Panel B. Minor discrepancies are likely attributable to differences in the year data was 
collected and sampling variability inherent to probability-based samples. Some differences are 
large, however.  
The analytic sample is younger, with 32 percent of participants between the ages of 18 to 
34, compared to 23 percent in the ACS and 27 percent in the GSS. A larger fraction of the 
analytic sample, 51 percent, report a household income of between $25,000 and $74,999, as 
compared to 39 percent in the ACS. As such, the analytic sample has fewer respondents 
reporting a household income of $75,000 or greater than the ACS, 24 percent relative to 40 
percent. As previously mentioned, 95 percent of the analytic sample reports being born in the 
United States as compared to 86 and 87 percent in the ACS and GSS, respectively. Perhaps most 
notably, as compared to Gallup polling, more of the analytic sample identifies as Democrat and a 
smaller share identifies as independent or other. 
 




Unsurprisingly, these discrepancies may cast doubt on the representativeness of any 
treatment effects identified in the analytic sample as estimates of their true value in the general 
population. Nevertheless, absent any theoretical reason to the contrary, this study can still 
provide insights about the causal relationships between the treatments tested and their outcomes 
in the general population.62 Given the diversity of the analytic sample on important 
characteristics and its similarity to nationally representative probability-based samples, there is 
no reason to believe that participation in the survey is correlated with opinions towards spending 
on SNAP and TANF in a way that might skew the results. As such, any observed shift in 
preferences for spending on SNAP and TANF in response to the treatments in the analytic 
sample can help inform our understanding of how such opinions might be expected to change in 
response to similar treatments in the general population.63 
Table 14 presents summary statistics across the control and treatment conditions. 
Balancing tests reveal no meaningful differences across the treatment conditions relative to the 
control condition.64 Comparing the spending preferences of those in the analytic sample assigned 
to the control condition to that found by a similar survey using a probability-based sample—
noting sampling variability and differences in data collection years—further boosts the case for 
the generalizability of this study’s finding to the broader population. Overall, in the case of 
 
62 Under the “fit-for-purpose” framework recommended by the American Association of Public Opinion Research 
(AAPOR), the choice between using a probability-based sample and a convenience sample depends on a study’s 
objective (Baker et al., 2013). While descriptive work necessarily requires a probability-based sample, a 
convenience sample may be appropriate for research focused on documenting relationships between variables. See 
Baker et al. (2013) and Coppock and McClellan (2019) for additional details about the “fit-for-purpose” framework. 
63 In fact, many relationships between treatments targeting public opinion and their outcomes identified using 
convenience samples recruited through online platforms (e.g., Facebook, Qualtrics, MTurk, and Lucid)  have been 
found to map onto the general population (Mullinix et al., 2015; Levay et al., 2016; Coppock et al., 2018; Coppock, 
2019; Coppock and McClellan, 2019; Boas et al., 2020).  
64 The observed discrepancies across the treatment conditions relative to the control condition are not unusual given 
the small sample sizes involved, even with randomization. F-tests for joint significance did not indicate any 
statistically significant differences across the treatment conditions relative to the control condition, indicating 
balance across the conditions. Only 7 of 112 t-tests on difference-in-means relative to the control condition were 




SNAP, 19.7, 37.7, and 42.6 percent of those in the control condition preferred that spending be 
decreased, remain unchanged, or increased, respectively. Quite similarly, a July 2018 Politico-
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health survey found the share of respondents preferring a 
decrease, no change, or increase in spending to be 19, 39, and 37 percent, respectively. Breaking 
down spending preferences across the two by political party affiliation also shows that the 
analytic sample is remarkably representative. Among Republicans in the control condition, 35.4, 
39.2, and 25.4 percent preferred that spending be decreased, remain unchanged, or increased, 
compared to 39, 44, and 13 percent in the probability-based sample. Among democrats, these 
figures are 9.1, 35.3, and 55.6 percent, and 7, 27, and 63 percent, for decreased spending, no 
change, or increased spending, respectively, across the two surveys.65 
Analysis 
 
For ease of interpretation, I use a baseline linear probability model for the main analysis. 
This model takes the following form: 
 
Outcomeit = β0 + δTreatment Conditionit + λCovariatesit + εit 
 
where subscripts i and t represent participant and control or treatment condition, respectively. 
Depending on the specification, Outcomei is either Increase SNAP or Increase or No Change 
SNAP. When examining the effect of being assigned to any of the treatment conditions, 
Treatment Conditionit is AnyTreat (with Control as the reference group). In regressions 
 
65 An analogous survey gauging public opinion on TANF or cash assistance by asking about spending preferences 
could not be found. However, the results from a poll conducted by Pew Research in September of 2019 found that, 
among those who agreed that there was too much income inequality in the United States, the vast majority preferred 
that the government invest in education and job training for the poor rather than provide direct assistance in the form 
of cash or tax credits overall and across income and political party affiliation (Horowitz, Igielnik, & Kochhar, 2020). 
Differences in survey design and subsampling aside, this is consistent with the preferences of those in the analytic 
sample assigned to the  control condition, the majority of whom favored that spending on TANF be decreased or 





disentangling the effect by type of treatment, Treatment Conditionit is either a vector of binary 
variables indicating whether a participant is in the Text Only or AnyImageTreat conditions, or the 
Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, or Text & White Image conditions (with 
Control as the reference group). To increase the precision of my estimates, Covariatesit is a 
vector of variables capturing participant characteristics, including gender, age, race, ethnicity, 
educational attainment, household income, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment 
status, utilization of social assistance programs, political party affiliation, and region. I test the 
sensitivity of the results to the choice of a linear probability model by supplementing the analysis 
with logit and generalized ordered logit models. For the latter, I substitute Spending SNAP in 
place of the binary outcomes. When examining support for TANF, the outcome measures are 
Increase TANF, Increase or No Change TANF, or Spending TANF.66  
To investigate differential responsiveness to the treatments across race, political party 
affiliation, and household income, I run separate regressions for each characteristic using the 
baseline model amended to include interactions as follows: 
Outcomeit = β0 + δTreatment Conditionit*Characteristicit+ λCovariatesit + εit  
For example, when investigating the effect of the treatments on whites, I interact white with Text 
Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image, and nonwhite with 
control, Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image such 
that the reference group is whites assigned to the control condition. I do this similarly with black 
and nonblack, repub and nonrepub, dem and nondem, highinc and nonhighinc, middleinc and 
 
66 To further verify that results are not sensitive to the coding scheme used to measure the outcomes of interest, two 
other sets of “continuous” measures are also used as outcomes. For the first set, preferences for decreased spending, 
no change, and increased spending take values of -1, 0, and 1, respectively. For the second set, these preferences 




nonmiddleinc, and lowinc and nonlowinc to investigate the effect on blacks, Republicans, and 
Democrats, and those from high-, middle-, and low- income households. 
As extensions, I also explore how the treatments affect how strongly participants feel 
about their spending preference and the reasons motivating their decision. To assess changes in 
the strength of participants’ spending preferences, the baseline model is estimated with Strength 
SNAP and Strength TANF as the outcomes. To examine their motivation, the outcomes used are 
Assistance, Involvement, Resources, Desirability, and Wastefulness. I run this analysis on 
subsamples stratified by spending preference. Finally, to check that any observed treatment 
effects are the result of the interventions employed and not some unintended manipulation, I 
assess the effect of assignment to the treatment conditions on preferences for increased spending 
on other activities. This is done by substituting California, J&J, Komen, Amazon, NYC, Walmart, 
and NFL for the outcome measures in the baseline model. 
Main Results 
Treatment Effects on Support for SNAP 
  
Figure 13 depicts the percent of participants in each condition indicating a preference for 
increased spending on SNAP. The dashed horizontal line represents the share in the control 
condition. Participants expressed a greater preference for increased spending on SNAP across all 
treatment conditions relative to the control condition, though the difference is smaller and not 
statistically significant in the Text & Black Image condition. Figure 14 presents the regression 
results.  
Beginning with Panel A, the overall effect of highlighting the child beneficiaries of 
SNAP is to increase support for the program relative to the control condition. Assignment to any 




increased spending on the program by 7.9 percentage points. In panel B, the effect is allowed to 
vary across the different treatments. Interestingly, mentioning children with and without imagery 
has the same effect on support for SNAP, increasing the likelihood of preferring increased 
spending on the program by 7.8 and 7.9 percentage points relative to the control condition. 
However, disaggregating further reveals qualitatively meaningful differences in the efficacy of 
the different treatments employing imagery, though the estimates are not statistically 
distinguishable from one another. Accompanying the statement mentioning children with an 
image of a diverse group of children has a moderating effect, raising the likelihood of preferring 
increased spending to 10.2 percentage points. When the image is that of black children, however, 
the combined effect of mentioning children and imagery is lower than either only mentioning 
children or doing so together with an image of diverse children, increasing the likelihood by only 
5.8 percentage points. Mentioning children together with an image of white children raises the 
likelihood by 7.8 percentage points.  
Results from logit and generalized ordered logit models are consistent with these 
findings, revealing similar patterns as seen in Appendix Table A25. Relative to the share of 
participants indicating a preference for increased spending on SNAP (42.6 percent) in the control 
condition, these constitute large effects. The effect of the Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text 
& Black Image, and Text & White Image treatments is to increase preference for more spending 
on SNAP by 18 to 24 percent. 
 
Shifting Preferences Away from Decreased Spending 
 
 Since SNAP is the target of reforms intended to reign in its scope and coverage, whether 
attitudes towards children can help to maintain at least existing levels of expenditures on the 




likelihood of preferring that spending be increased or remaining unchanged. Using this more 
expansive measure of support for the program reveals the same patterns as before. As seen in 
Panel A, highlighting children is effective for increasing support for SNAP, raising the 
likelihood that participants prefer spending on the program to be increased or remain unchanged 
by 6.4 percentage points relative to the control condition. Letting the effect vary by the type of 
treatment in Panel B again shows the effects of mentioning children with and without imagery to 
be similar, raising the likelihood by 6.1 and 6.6 percentage points, respectively. Further 
disaggregating the results reveals qualitatively meaningful and statistically distinguishable 
differences, however.  
These effects are 6.1, 9.1, 4.8, and 5.8 percentage across the Text Only, Text & Diverse 
Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image treatments, respectively. The effect of the 
Text & Diverse Image treatment is statistically distinguishable from the others. The effect of only 
mentioning children is moderated by the addition of an image of a diverse group of children (p-
value=0.095). An image of a diverse group of children is also more effective than when the 
children are characterized as black (p-value=0.022) or white (p-value=0.082). Also notable is 
that the gap between effects when images of black and white children are displayed is now 
smaller.  
As before, results from logit and generalized ordered logit models are consistent with 
these findings, as seen in Appendix Table A25. To get a better sense of how preferences are 
changing, Figure 15 shows the distribution of spending preferences for SNAP across the control 
and treatment conditions. Comparing the distribution of spending preferences in the treatment 
conditions to that of the control condition suggests that preferences are being shifted away from 




Differential Responsiveness Across Participants 
 
 Panel A of Figure 16 shows preferences for spending on SNAP among participants in the 
control condition by race, political party, and income. Non-whites, Democrats, and low-income 
participants express support for increased spending at higher levels than whites, Republicans, 
and those from middle- and high-income households. This variation suggests that participants 
from diverse backgrounds may be differentially responsive to the treatments. Table 15 presents 
the regression results by participant characteristics. The same pattern as before emerges across 
whites, Republicans, and those from high- and middle-income households, with greater increases 
in the likelihood of participants preferring more spending in response to the Text Only, Text & 
Diverse Image, and Text & White Image treatments as compared to the Text & Black Image 
treatment. 
 Among whites, the Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & 
White Image treatments raise the likelihood of preferring increased spending on SNAP relative to 
the control condition by 6.2, 13.7, 5.7, and 11.3 percentage points, respectively. Notably, the 
estimated effect is smaller when children are characterized as black as compared to white or 
diverse, differences that are statistically significant.67 Similarly, among Republicans, the 
estimated coefficients are 10.2, 8.6, 3.3, and 7.3 percentage points, though the latter two are 
statistically insignificant. Relative to the share of Republicans in the control condition preferring 
more spending on the program (25 percent), the effects of the Text Only and Text & Diverse 
Image treatments constitute increases of 40.8 and 34.4 percent, respectively. The magnitude of 
the estimates do not vary substantially across the different treatments for those from high-income 
 
67 These effects are statistically distinguishable from one another at conventional levels (p-value≤0.10), with the 
exception of the Text Only & Text & Black Image, Text Only & Text & White Image, and Text & Diverse Image & 




households, hovering around 7 and 9 percentage points, and are statistically significant only 
when children are mentioned together with an image of a diverse group of children.68 
Participants from middle-income households are more responsive than their higher-income 
counterparts.69 
Among blacks, simply mentioning children has a large effect, raising the likelihood of 
preferring increased spending on SNAP by 16.7 percentage points, a 32 percent increase over the 
share of blacks preferring more spending in the control condition (53 percent).70 Interestingly, 
blacks are not responsiveness to treatments that include imagery of a diverse group of children or 
white children, the estimates for which are negative, qualitatively small, and statistically 
insignificant. Although the effect when children are characterized as black is statistically 
insignificant, it is a qualitatively large 10.6 percentage points. Democrats, are roughly similarly 
responsive across all treatments. Considering that support for SNAP among democrats is high at 
nearly 56 percent in the control condition, these effects suggest that there is still room for 
bolstering support for the program among this demographic. Preferences for increased spending 
on SNAP are not altered among those from low-income households, who already support the 
program at higher levels than any another group.71 
 These results suggest that highlighting the children that benefit from SNAP can boost 
support for the program among whites, Republicans, and high- and middle-income households, 
key social and demographic groups with substantial political influence. Who the child 
 
68 Effects across treatment conditions among Republicans and those from high-income households are not 
statistically distinguishable from one another. 
69 The effects for the Text Only and Text & Diverse Image treatments are statistically distinguishable from that of the 
TIB treatment at conventional levels (p-value≤0.10).   
70 The effect of Text Only is statistically distinguishable from that of the Text & Diverse Image and Text & White 
Image conditions at conventional levels (p-value≤0.10). 
71 Effects across treatments conditions among Democrats and those from low-income households are not statistically 




beneficiaries are matters, however. The induced support for SNAP is smaller when the children 
are characterized as black as compared to white or racially and ethnically diverse. These results 
also suggest that highlighting child beneficiaries can also increase support for the program 
among groups that already lean towards supporting the program, such as Democrats and blacks.  
Extensions 
Strength of Preference and Motivation 
 
 Table 16 shows how the strength of participant’s spending preference for SNAP was 
affected by the different treatments relative to the control condition, separately across 
participants who expressed a preference for spending to be decreased, remain unchanged, or 
increased. Among those that preferred decreased spending, the coefficient estimates are mostly 
negative—indicating that attitudes toward lower spending may be less firmly held than before—
though none are statistically significant. This result is in line with the finding that shifts in 
attitudes towards increased spending on the program may be occurring primarily among those 
who would have otherwise preferred decreased spending. The Text & Black Image and Text & 
White Image treatments strengthened attitudes towards spending preferences among those that 
preferred spending to remain unchanged. These effects constitute 8.9 and 7.5 percent increases in 
strength of preference, respectively, relative to an average score of 1.7 among those in the 
control condition. Among participants who indicated a preference for increased spending, only 
the Text & White Image treatment altered the strength of attitudes, by 3.7 percent relative to an 
average score of 2.46 in the control condition.  
 The results for participants motivation among those who preferred spending to be 
decreased, remain unchanged, or increased are shown in Table 17. Beginning with the results in 




that program beneficiaries could be “doing more to help themselves” (Assistance) lower in terms 
of importance in response to the Text Only  and Text & Black Image treatments. These effects are 
qualitatively large, constituting decreases of 9.6 and 8.1 percent relative to an average score 2.41 
among those in the control condition, and suggest that participants may be more likely to view 
SNAP beneficiaries, including black beneficiaries, as deserving of aid when children are 
highlighted.  
In Panel B, among those preferring no change in spending, the Text & Black Image 
treatment led to increases in how important participants felt about the statements that 
beneficiaries are “getting the assistance they need” (Assistance) and that the “government is as 
involved as it should be in food assistance” (Involvement). Relative to the average score in the 
control condition, these effects constituted increases of 10.3 and 9.7 percent, respectively. Lastly, 
among those that preferred increased spending in Panel C, only the Text & White Image 
treatment altered motivations, increasing the importance that participants put on the statements 
that spending on food assistance is a “desirable thing to do” (Desirability) by 3.3 percent relative 
to the average score in the control condition, respectively. This suggests that egalitarian 
sentiments are stronger when children receiving benefits are characterized as white.  
Treatment Effects on support for TANF 
 
As mentioned above, SNAP and TANF differ in their design, with the former providing 
benefits that can only be spent on food and the latter providing direct cash assistance. As such, 
the effect of highlighting children on support may differ across the two programs. As seen in 
Figure 13, preferences for increased spending on TANF is generally lower relative to that for 
SNAP. Regression results for TANF are presented in Table 18. Beginning with column 1 and 




4.1 percentage points relative to the control condition. As seen in Panel C, however, the effect is 
driven by the priming of white children, which raises the likelihood of preferring increased 
spending by 9 percentage points, an increase of 21.4 percent relative to the share of participants 
preferring increased spending in the control condition.72  
Expanding the definition of support to include preferences for spending to remain 
unchanged in column 2 reveals similar patterns as in the case of SNAP, though the estimated 
effects are less pronounced. Focusing on Panel C, the Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, and Text 
& White Image conditions raise the likelihood of support for preferring spending to be increased 
or remain unchanged by 4.1, 5.5, and 3.5 percentage points relative to the control condition, 
respectively. The effect when black children are primed is qualitatively smaller and statistically 
insignificant.73,74 Figure 17 shows that preferences for spending on TANF are being shifted 
away from decreased spending to no change, with the exception of the Text & White Image 
condition, which shifts preferences away from decreased spending and towards increased 
spending. 
As in the case of SNAP, support for increased spending on TANF varies across 
participants in a similar manner, as shown in Panel B of Figure 7. Table 19 presents the 
regression results across race, political party, and household income. Among whites, 
Republicans, Democrats, and those from high, middle, and low-income households, only when 
priming white children are the estimates meaningfully large, though only that for whites and 
 
72 The effect of Text & White Image is statistically different than each of the effects of Text Only, Text & Diverse 
Image, and Text & Black Image at conventional levels (p-value≤0.10) 
73 The effects of Text & Diverse Image and Text & Black Image are statistically different from one another at 
conventional levels (p-value≤0.10). 
74 As in the case of SNAP, results from logit and generalized ordered logit models are consistent with these findings, 




Republicans is statistically significant. Those from middle-income households and Republicans 
are also responsive when children are mentioned without any racial cues or characterized as 
racially and ethnically diverse, respectively. In the case of TANF, the treatments did little to alter 
how strongly participants felt about their preferred spending on the program, except to soften 
attitudes among those who preferred decreased spending in the Text Only condition. Results are 
shown in Appendix Table A26. 
 The Text Only and Text & Black Image treatments lower the importance that participants 
preferring decreased spending placed on the statements that the “government should not be 
involved in cash assistance” (Involvement) and that spending on cash assistance is “not good a 
use of resources” (Resources) by 13.2 and 11.3 percent, respectively, relative to average scores 
in the control condition. The former result suggests that aversion to government intervention was 
less forceful when children were highlighted, while the latter suggests that the depiction of black 
children activates more egalitarian sentiments. There were no statistically significant changes in 
motivations among participants preferring spending to remain unchanged or be increased. 
Results are shown in Appendix Table A27. 
Probing the Results 
Sample Composition 
 
 I test the sensitivity of the main results to sample composition in two ways. First, I 
expand the analytic sample to include all participants, regardless of whether they passed the 
attention check question. Unsurprisingly, and as seen in Table A28 of the Appendix, those who 
did and did not pass the attention check differ markedly. Using this more inclusive sample does 




the results, showing the same patterns as observed using the analytic sample.75 Again, this 
bolsters the case for the generalizability of the results. Second, I restrict the analytic sample to 
only include participants who spent at least 5 minutes and no more than 25 minutes on the survey 
so as to exclude potentially anomalous responses from  participants who may have spent too 
little or too much time answering the questions. Again, the results are substantively similar, as 
seen in Panel B of Table A29 in the Appendix. 
Manipulation Checks 
  
 If the shifts in spending preferences are in response to the specific interventions 
employed and not some unintended manipulation, assignment to the treatment conditions would 
not be expected to have much of an effect, if any, on spending preferences for activities 
conducted by other entities. As seen in Panel A of Table A30 in the Appendix, with a few 
exceptions, assignment to the treatment conditions had no effect on preferences for increased 
spending on other activities. Most estimates are qualitatively small and statistically insignificant. 
Given that these results are based on comparisons with the control condition, the use of images 
could be a source of variation that may account for the observed statistically significant 
estimates. Panel B presents the effect of assignment to the Text & Black Image and Text & White 
Image conditions as compared to the Text & Diverse Image condition only. As before, estimates 




75 These regressions include controls for gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, age, household income, 
region, political party affiliation, and whether participant passed the attention check question. Since survey 
participants had to pass the attention check to be shown the questions inquiring about their socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics, only data provided by Lucid could be used in the analysis. As such, controls for 






 Welfare programs are often the subject of scrutiny among the public and targets for 
reform among legislators. Motivating these attitudes and efforts are perceptions of beneficiaries 
as undeserving of aid, disproportionately black, or both. Yet many of these beneficiaries are 
children, who presumably cannot be undeserving. To the extent that views on welfare programs 
are shaped by the groups perceived to be their beneficiaries, highlighting their more sympathetic 
demographics may make them more appealing. This study presents the results from a large 
survey experiment testing whether highlighting the child beneficiaries of SNAP—the largest 
food assistance program in the country and one of the largest welfare programs—can boost 
support for the program. 
 Overall, I find that accentuating the child beneficiaries of SNAP can boost support, 
narrowly defined, for the program by nearly 19 percent. This is a meaningfully large effect. I 
also find that this effect varies depending on how children are highlighted. Although the 
estimates were not statistically different from one another, the effects of simply mentioning 
children and mentioning children with an image of diverse children, black children, or white 
children, increased support by roughly 18, 24, 14, and 18 percent, respectively. The same pattern 
was observed when using a more expansive definition of support. In this context, the effect of 
mentioning children together with an image of a diverse group of children was statistically 
distinguishable from that of only mentioning children or doing so together with imagery of black 
or white children. 
These effects reveal a disturbing pattern, however. Although characterizing the children 
benefitting from SNAP as black still leads to increases in support for the program, the effect is 




conforms with research revealing disparities across white and black children and youth in 
criminal sentencing and school disciplinary sanctions, which may in part be due to negative 
perceptions of blacks (Bridges & Steen, 1998; Monroe, 2005; Gregory, Skiba, & Noguera, 
2010). To the extent that support for SNAP are driven by beliefs about the perceived 
deservingness of children, this effect is somewhat counteracted by racial antipathies. Black 
children do not elicit the same level of sympathy as their white counterparts. 
 I also find that highlighting children can boost support for SNAP among whites, 
Republicans, and participants from high- and middle-income households, key political 
constituencies that typically express lower support for welfare programs as compared to other 
social and demographic groups. Given the association of more rigid and restrictive eligibility 
criteria and program rules with political conservatism and racial attitudes, boosting support 
among these groups may help to mitigate disparities in the implementation of SNAP across 
jurisdictions, thereby helping to promote social equity and economic equality. Support is also 
bolstered among Democrats and blacks, suggesting that that there is room for improvement on 
this margin even among groups that typically favor welfare programs.  
Qualitatively, the responsiveness of whites, Republicans, and those from middle-income 
households reveals the same pattern as before. Among whites, these responses are statistically 
distinguishable: estimated effects are smaller when children are characterized as black as 
compared to white or diverse. Recalling that the image of diverse children includes a white child 
and considering the latter two effects together suggests in-group bias—white adults are more 
likely to favor white children. The disparity therefore suggests out-group aversion—white adults 
are less likely to identify with black or minority children. Alternatively, however, depicting 




from all backgrounds rather than only minorities or a specific group (e.g., blacks), thereby 
making it more appealing to whites.  
In several extensions, I find that highlighting children also shifted underlying 
motivations. Perceptions of beneficiaries as undeserving were softened when children were 
mentioned among those that did not support the program, even when those children were black. 
Characterizing children as white elicited more egalitarian sentiments among those who supported 
the program. Finally, highlighting the children benefitting from TANF also bolsters support for 
that program, though more so with regards to maintaining its current level of benefits than 
increasing its expenditures—the exception being when children are characterized as white. 
Whereas characterizing the children benefiting as black still raised support for SNAP overall, no 
such effect was found in the context of TANF. In fact, disaggregating the results by key political 
constituencies revealed that only when children were characterized as white or diverse, or not 
racialized at all, was support for the program raised. In line with previous work suggesting that 
public opinion on government programs is in part influenced by how those programs are 
designed, participants may have made a distinction between SNAP, which offers vouchers that 
can only be used for the purchase of food, and TANF, which offers assistance in the form of cash  
In sum, highlighting the child beneficiaries of SNAP can boost public support for the 
program and can be effective in the context of other welfare programs as well, though how the 
child beneficiaries are characterized and in what way that information is conveyed matters. Of 
concern is that black children do not elicit the same feelings of deservingness as white children. 
Furthermore, considering that participants were told that SNAP expenditures on benefits 




suggest that the public may be willing to spend far more than current levels on providing 
households in need with assistance. 
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Figures & Tables 
 
Figure 10. Experimental Conditions 
Panel A. SNAP Statements 
Control 
The federal government provides food and nutrition assistance to 
people living in the United States through the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (formerly the Food Stamp Program). In 2016, the 
government provided $66 billion in food assistance to program 
participants.  
Treatment Conditions  
Text Only The federal government provides food and nutrition assistance to 
people – including 20 million children – living in the United States 
through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly the 
Food Stamp Program). In 2016, the government provided $66 billion in 
food assistance to program participants.  
Text & Image 
Text & Black Image 
Text & White Image 
Panel B. TANF Statements 
Control 
The federal and state governments provide cash assistance to families 
living in the United States through the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families program. In 2016, state governments and the federal 
government provided a combined $7 billion in cash assistance to 
program participants. 
Treatment Conditions  
Text Only The federal and state governments provide cash assistance to families 
with children living in the United States through the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families program. In 2016, state governments and 
the federal government provided a combined $7 billion in cash 
assistance to program participants. 
Text & Image 
Text & Black Image 
Text & White Image 















Figure 11. Treatment Condition Images 
Panel A. SNAP Images 
 
Panel B. TANF Image 
 
Note: From left to right in Panel A, image accompanying the SNAP statement in the Text & Image, Text 
& Black Image, and Text & White Image conditions. Panel B shows image accompanying the TANF 






























Figure 12. Follow-up questions 
Spending 
preference 
I believe that… 
Increased 
…those who benefit from spending on [activity] could use more assistance. 
…that the [entity] should be more involved in [activity]. 
…spending on [activity] is a good use of resources. 
… spending on [activity] is a desirable thing to do. 
Remain 
Unchanged 
…those who benefit from spending on [activity] are getting the assistance they need. 
…the [entity] is as involved as it should be in [activity]. 
…spending on [activity] is neither a good nor bad use of resources. 
…spending on [activity] is neither a desirable nor undesirable thing to do. 
Decreased 
…those who benefit from spending on [activity] could be doing more to help themselves. 
…the [entity] should not be involved in [activity]. 
…spending on [activity] is wasteful in how it spends on [activity]. 
…spending on [activity] is not a good use of resources. 
…spending on [activity] is not a desirable thing to do. 
Note: Figure displays the list of reasons participants are asked to choose from to indicate their underlying 
















Figure 13. Percent Favoring Increased Spending across Control and Treatment Conditions 
  
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Figures depict the percent 
of participants in each treatment condition indicating a preference for increased spending, with the percent 
indicating a preference for increased spending in the control condition represented by the dashed horizontal 
line. The percent of participants favoring increased spending in each treatment condition was separately 
compared to that for the control condition using t-tests. Robust standard errors with confidence intervals at 





















Figure 14. Treatment Effects on Spending Preferences, SNAP 
Panel A. Any Treatment Condition 
 
Panel B. By Type of Treatment 
 
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Figures depict coefficient 
estimates from three separate regressions with Increase SNAP or Increase or No Change SNAP as the 
dependent variables. Panel A presents the effect of being assigned to any of the treatment conditions. 
Panel B presents the effect of assignment to the Text Only condition or any of the image treatment 
conditions (left) and assignment to the Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and 
Text & White Image conditions (right), relative to the control. Each regression includes controls for age, 
gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, 
parental status, employment status, and receipt of social assistance.  Robust standard errors with 




Figure 15. Distribution of Spending Preferences Across Conditions, SNAP 
 
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Figure shows the 























































Figure 16. Spending Preferences in Control Condition by Race, Political Party, and Income 
Panel A. Preferences for SNAP Spending 
 
Panel B. Preferences for TANF Spending 
 
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Figure shows preferences 
for spending on SNAP and TANF among participants in the control group separately by race, political 
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Figure 17. Distribution of Spending Preferences Across Conditions, TANF 
 
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Figure shows the 






















































Table 13. Summary Statistics for Analytic Sample 
 Analytic Sample  2017 ACS 2018 GSS 2020 Gallup 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Characteristics used by Lucid to match the US Census 
 Female 53  51 55 - 
 Hispanic 13  18 15 - 
 White 74  72 72 - 
 Black 12  13 16 - 
 Other 14  15 12 - 
 Bachelors or higher 34  32 33 - 
 Age      
    Young (18-34) 32  23 27 - 
    Middle (35-64) 52  39 59 - 
    Elderly (65+) 16  16 23 - 
 Household Income      
    Low ($0-24,999) 25  20.3 35 - 
    Middle ($25,000-74,999) 51  39.4 - - 
    High ($75,000 or more) 24  40.3 - - 
 Region      
    Northeast 20  17 15 - 
    Midwest 19  21 22 - 
    South 37  38 41 - 
    West 24  24 22 - 
Panel B: Other characteristics 
 Born in USA 95  86 87 - 
 Married† 44  48 43 - 
 Parent 56  - 72 - 
 Employed†† 55  60 59 - 
 Social assistance 26  - - - 
 Democrat‡ 38  - 32 29 
 Republican‡ 31  - 23 30 
 Independent/other‡ 32  - 46 39 
 Liberal‡‡ 32  - 29 26 
 Conservative‡‡ 34  - 33 35 
 Moderate‡‡ 35  - 38 35 
      
 Minutes 14.02     
      
 Observations 3106     
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. All figures for 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in percentages and rounded to the nearest integer. Columns 
1 presents summary statistics for the analytic sample. Sample collected through an online survey experiment 
conducted by Lucid between February 20, 2020 and March 7th, 2020. Columns 2, 3, and 4 present national 
estimates for select variables for comparison. Column 2 presents data from the 2017 American Community 
Survey (ACS) 1-year estimates. Column 3 presents data from the 2018 General Social Survey. Column 4 
presents data from Gallup poll inquiring about political party affiliation and political ideology. 
† ACS Data for those 15 and older. 
†† ACS Data for those 16 and older. 
‡ Gallup data from February 2020 polling. 




Table 14. Summary Statistics by Control and Treatment Conditions 







Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Female 51 53 51 54 54 
 Hispanic 13 11 12 15 13 
 White 75 71 73 75 74 
 Black 12 15 12 8 11 
 Other 13 14 14 16 14 
 Bachelors or higher 35 33 34 35 35 
 Age      
    Young (18-34) 32 34 33 29 33 
    Middle (35-64) 53 48 55 56 50 
    Elderly (65+) 15 18 12 15 17 
 Household Income      
    Low ($0-24,999) 27 25 24 23 25 
    Middle ($25,000-74,999) 50 53 51 52 49 
    High ($75,000 or more) 23 22 25 25 26 
 Born in USA 97 94 95 92 95 
 Married 41 44 44 46 44 
 Parent 54 56 53 59 58 
 Employed 52 54 56 56 56 
 Social assistance 28 27 25 25 25 
 Region      
    Northeast 20 20 17 22 23 
    Midwest 19 19 19 18 18 
    South 38 37 39 34 37 
    West 23 24 24 26 23 
 Democrat 38 40 38 36 36 
 Republican 29 28 30 33 33 
 Independent/other 33 32 32 31 31 
 Liberal 31 34 32 31 31 
 Conservative 34 32 33 35 36 
 Moderate 35 35 36 34 33 
      
 Minutes 19.19 12.43 11.94 14.36 12.19 
      
Observations 615 643 603 637 608 
 
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. All figures for 








Table 15. Differential Responsiveness, SNAP, by Race, Political Party, and Income 
 Race Political Party Household Income 
 Whites Blacks Republican Democrat High Middle Low 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) 
        
Text Only 0.062** 0.167** 0.102** 0.083* 0.080 0.125*** -0.018 
 (0.031) (0.076) (0.047) (0.044) (0.055) (0.038) (0.053) 
Text & Diverse Image 0.137*** -0.004 0.086* 0.113** 0.093* 0.134*** 0.049 
 (0.031) (0.081) (0.047) (0.045) (0.054) (0.038) (0.055) 
Text & Black Image 0.057* 0.106 0.033 0.102** 0.066 0.062* 0.049 
    (0.030) (0.088) (0.044) (0.045) (0.052) (0.038) (0.053) 
Text & White Image 0.113*** -0.039 0.073 0.092** 0.083 0.110*** 0.012 
    (0.031) (0.086) (0.046) (0.046) (0.054) (0.039) (0.054) 
        
Avg. in Control 0.40 .53 0.25 0.56 0.32 0.39 0.58 
Observations 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 
R-squared 0.112 0.111 0.107 0.107 0.108 0.108 0.108 
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Each column represents a separate regression with the 
characteristic corresponding to the column title interacted with Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image.  
Across columns 1-8, the reference groups are whites, blacks, Republicans, and Democrats, and those from high-, middle-, and low-income 
households, in the control condition, respectively. The dependent variable is Increase SNAP. Each regression includes controls for age, gender, 
race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment status, and receipt 

















VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Text Only -0.164 0.090 0.059 
 (0.124) (0.077) (0.052) 
Text & Diverse Image 0.079 -0.000 0.016 
 (0.117) (0.080) (0.055) 
Text & Black Image -0.154 0.152** 0.042 
    (0.120) (0.076) (0.053) 
Text & White Image -0.048 0.127* 0.091* 
    (0.119) (0.077) (0.052) 
    
Avg. Control Score 2.21 1.70 2.46 
Observations 456 1,115 1,480 
R-squared 0.062 0.042 0.066 
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Each column represents a 
separate regression on a subsample stratified by participant’s spending preference corresponding to the 
column title.  The dependent variable in each is Strength SNAP. Each regression includes controls for age, 
gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, 
parental status, employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses 

















Table 17. Motivation for Spending Preference, SNAP 
 Assistance Involvement Resources Desirability Wastefulness 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Among Participants Preferring Decreased Spending 
Text Only -0.231* -0.116 -0.228 -0.092 -0.119 
 (0.124) (0.143) (0.143) (0.150) (0.125) 
Text & Diverse Image -0.048 -0.001 -0.111 0.135 0.038 
 (0.117) (0.144) (0.147) (0.139) (0.116) 
Text & Black Image -0.195* 0.084 0.053 0.032 -0.025 
    (0.107) (0.132) (0.132) (0.134) (0.118) 
Text & White Image -0.159 0.117 0.028 0.075 0.023 
    (0.106) (0.131) (0.137) (0.138) (0.116) 
      
Avg. Control Score 2.41 1.48 1.64 1.55 2.34 
Observations 459 451 449 443 459 
R-squared 0.090 0.053 0.041 0.043 0.112 
Panel B: Among Participants Preferring No Change in Spending 
Text Only 0.064 0.123 0.078 0.034  
 (0.071) (0.077) (0.080) (0.078)  
Text & Diverse Image 0.095 0.014 -0.039 -0.087  
 (0.075) (0.079) (0.082) (0.083)  
Text & Black Image 0.185** 0.168** 0.028 -0.069  
    (0.073) (0.076) (0.080) (0.080)  
Text & White Image 0.056 0.049 0.018 0.003  
    (0.073) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078)  
      
Avg. Control Score 1.79 1.73 1.51 1.51  
Observations 1,125 1,117 1,102 1,094  
R-squared 0.038 0.051 0.043 0.057  
Panel C: Among Participants Preferring Increased Spending 
Text Only -0.029 0.021 0.001 0.012  
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.048) (0.049)  
Text & Diverse Image -0.054 -0.039 -0.048 -0.025  
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.051) (0.049)  
Text & Black Image -0.022 -0.038 -0.024 0.022  
    (0.053) (0.055) (0.049) (0.050)  
Text & White Image 0.055 0.030 0.069 0.085*  
    (0.050) (0.051) (0.046) (0.046)  
      
Avg. Control Score 2.53 2.55 2.61 2.59  
Observations 1,491 1,485 1,485 1,485  
R-squared 0.062 0.051 0.070 0.064  
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Table presents the results 
form separate regressions with the dependent variables corresponding to the column titles. Samples in 
panels A, B and C include only observations indicating a preference for spending to be decreased, remain 
unchanged, or increased, respectively. Each regression includes controls for age, gender, race and 
ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status, 
employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** 




Table 18. Treatment Effects on Spending Preferences, TANF 
 Increase Increase or No Change 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Panel A: Any Treatment 
AnyTreat 0.041* 0.037** 
 (0.022) (0.015) 
   
R-squared 0.073 0.048 
   
Panel B: By Type of Treatment 
TO 0.033 0.041** 
 (0.027) (0.019) 
AnyImageTreat 0.043* 0.036** 
 (0.022) (0.015) 
   
R-squared 0.074 0.048 
   
Panel C: By Type of Treatment  
Text Only 0.033 0.041** 
 (0.027) (0.019) 
Text & Diverse Image 0.031 0.055*** 
 (0.028) (0.019) 
Text & Black Image 0.010 0.018 
    (0.027) (0.020) 
Text & White Image 0.090*** 0.035* 
 (0.027) (0.020) 
   
R-squared 0.076 0.049 
   
Avg. in Control .421 .842 
Observations 3,106 3,106 
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Table depicts coefficient 
estimates from six separate regressions with Increase TANF or Increase or No Change TANF as the 
dependent variables. Panel A presents the effect of being assigned to any of the treatment conditions 
(AnyTreat). Panel B presents the effect of assignment to the Text Only condition or any of the image 
treatment conditions (AnyImageTreat). Panel C presents the effect of assignment to the Text Only, Text & 
Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, or Text & White Image conditions. Each regression includes controls 
for age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, 
marital status, parental status, employment status, and receipt of social assistance.  Robust standard errors 









Table 19. Differential Responsiveness, TANF, by Race, Political Party, and Income 
 Race  Political Party  Household Income 
 Whites Blacks  Republican Democrat  High Middle Low 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (6) (7) (8) 
         
Text Only 0.032 0.042  0.037 0.052  -0.051 0.077** 0.017 
 (0.031) (0.078)  (0.046) (0.044)  (0.054) (0.037) (0.053) 
Text & Diverse Image 0.038 0.014  0.095** -0.064  -0.001 0.055 0.012 
 (0.032) (0.083)  (0.048) (0.046)  (0.055) (0.039) (0.057) 
Text & Black Image 0.005 0.050  0.028 -0.040  -0.024 0.018 0.030 
    (0.031) (0.089)  (0.045) (0.046)  (0.054) (0.038) (0.055) 
Text & White Image 0.096*** 0.048  0.084* 0.072  0.064 0.113*** 0.068 
    (0.031) (0.084)  (0.047) (0.046)  (0.054) (0.039) (0.055) 
          
Avg. in Control 0.40 0.50  0.25 0.59  0.39 0.46 0.50 
R-squared 0.077 0.077  0.081 0.081  0.078 0.078 0.078 
Observations 3,106 3,106  3,106 3,106  3,106 3,106 3,106 
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Each column represents a separate regression with the characteristic 
corresponding to the column title interacted with Text Only, Text & Diverse Image, Text & Black Image, and Text & White Image.  Across columns 
1-8, the reference groups are whites, blacks, Republicans, and Democrats, and those from high-, middle-, and low-income households, in the control 
condition, respectively. The dependent variable is Increase TANF. Each regression includes controls for age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational 
attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust 











Note: Images associated with the statements (excluding statements pertaining to SNAP and TANF). Images 
in top row pertain to the state of California, Johnson & Johnson, Susan G. Komen, Amazon, New York 

























Figure A4. Survey Statements 
All Conditions: 
1) The state government of California administers and finances numerous programs pertaining to the education of 
its residents. In 2017, the state’s legislature approved a budget that allocated $75 billion toward spending on K-12 
education and community colleges. 
 
2) Johnson & Johnson is a for-profit medical device, pharmaceutical, and consumer packaged goods manufacturing 
company based in the United States. In 2016, the company spent $9 billion on research and development, much of 
it directed toward medications for rare conditions.  
Control Condition: 
3) The federal government provides food and nutrition assistance to people living in the United States through the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly the Food Stamp Program). In 2016, the government provided 
$66 billion in food assistance to program participants. 
Treatment Conditions: 
3) The federal government provides food and nutrition assistance to people - including 20 million children - living 
in the United States through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly the Food Stamp Program). 
In 2016, the government provided $66 billion in food assistance to program participants. 
All Conditions: 
4) Susan G. Komen is a not-for-profit organization that promotes breast cancer awareness, research, health services, 
and social support programs in the United States. In 2016, $21 million of the organization’s expenditures were 
directed toward fundraising efforts. 
 
5) Amazon is a for-profit online retailer and cloud-computing company based in the United States. In 2015, the 
company donated $13 million to various charities via the AmazonSmiles foundation. 
 
6) The New York City municipal government provides numerous services involving transportation, sewage, and 
power for its residents. In 2015, the city approved a budget that allocated about $28 billion for infrastructure 
spending.  
 
7) Walmart is a for-profit retailer based in the United States. In 2016, the company donated $300 million to various 
causes via the Walmart Foundation. 
 
8) The National Football League (NFL) is a professional sports league representing 32 for-profit teams based in 
the United States. In 2016, the league pledged to spend $100 million over five years on research and projects to 
reduce the risk of head trauma among its athletes. 
Control Condition: 
9) The federal and state governments provide cash assistance to families living in the United States through the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. In 2016, state governments and the federal government 
provided a combined $7 billion in cash assistance to program participants. 
Treatment Conditions: 
9) The federal and state governments provide cash assistance to families with children living in the 
United States through the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. In 2016, state 
governments and the federal government provided a combined $7 billion in cash assistance to program 
participants. 
Attention Check: 
10) Tesla is a for-profit automotive and energy company based in the United States. In 2018, the 
company increased its research and development budget by $90 million dollars. 






Table A25. Treatment Effects on Spending Preferences, Alternative Models 
 Logit Models  Generalized Ordered Logit Models  















VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
           
Text Only 0.351*** 0.480*** 0.145 0.358**  0.350*** 0.451*** 0.137 0.383**  
 (0.121) (0.163) (0.117) (0.172)  (0.120) (0.161) (0.116) (0.172)  
Text & Diverse Image 0.457*** 0.775*** 0.137 0.488***  0.453*** 0.739*** 0.129 0.453**  
 (0.122) (0.176) (0.121) (0.178)  (0.122) (0.176) (0.121) (0.177)  
Text & Black Image 0.264** 0.377** 0.046 0.144  0.254** 0.383** 0.025 0.128  
    (0.120) (0.156) (0.119) (0.162)  (0.119) (0.155) (0.119) (0.162)  
Text & White Image 0.355*** 0.446*** 0.394*** 0.292*  0.352*** 0.407** 0.373*** 0.271  
    (0.122) (0.163) (0.120) (0.168)  (0.121) (0.161) (0.119) (0.167)  
 
Observations 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106  3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106  
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Columns 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, present the results from separate 
regressions where the dependent variables are Increase SNAP and Increase or No Change SNAP, and Increase TANF and Increase or No Change 
TANF, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 present the output at the cutoffs from a single generalized ordered logit regression with Spending SNAP as 
the dependent variable. Columns 7 and 8 present the same with Spending TANF as the dependent variable. Each regression includes controls for 
age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment status, 



















VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Text Only -0.195* 0.097 -0.021 
 (0.117) (0.073) (0.055) 
Text & Diverse Image -0.000 0.000 0.045 
 (0.132) (0.075) (0.054) 
Text & Black Image -0.096 0.091 0.027 
    (0.117) (0.075) (0.054) 
Text & White Image 0.003 0.012 0.030 
    (0.118) (0.077) (0.052) 
    
Avg. Control Score 2.25 1.71 2.48 
Observations 450 1,265 1,378 
R-squared 0.061 0.044 0.041 
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Each column represents a 
separate regression on a subsample stratified by participant’s spending preference corresponding to the 
column title.  The dependent variable in each is Strength TANF. Each regression includes controls for age, 
gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, 
parental status, employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
























Table A27. Motivation for Spending Preference, TANF 
 Assistance Involvement Resources Desirability Wastefulness 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Among Participants Preferring Decreased Spending 
Text Only -0.029 -0.252* -0.213 0.111 -0.155 
 (0.122) (0.142) (0.155) (0.151) (0.128) 
Text & Diverse Image -0.106 0.071 -0.036 0.132 -0.061 
 (0.136) (0.150) (0.145) (0.156) (0.141) 
Text & Black Image -0.171 -0.026 -0.234* -0.028 -0.012 
    (0.123) (0.141) (0.134) (0.141) (0.119) 
Text & White Image 0.048 -0.011 -0.097 -0.040 -0.016 
    (0.113) (0.143) (0.140) (0.153) (0.124) 
      
Avg. Control Score 2.34 1.91 2.08 1.89 2.30 
Observations 404 398 403 399 395 
R-squared 0.136 0.072 0.126 0.087 0.072 
Panel B: Among Participants Preferring No Change in Spending 
Text Only 0.030 0.101 0.065 0.086  
 (0.067) (0.069) (0.073) (0.071)  
Text & Diverse Image -0.028 0.052 -0.024 -0.033  
 (0.069) (0.073) (0.076) (0.075)  
Text & Black Image 0.109 0.111 0.013 -0.036  
    (0.068) (0.072) (0.076) (0.074)  
Text & White Image -0.055 0.003 0.104 0.092  
    (0.073) (0.075) (0.078) (0.076)  
      
Avg. Control Score 1.77 1.76 1.55 1.57  
Observations 1,277 1,276 1,263 1,252  
R-squared 0.044 0.046 0.029 0.032  
Panel C: Among Participants Preferring Increased Spending 
Text Only -0.049 -0.056 -0.017 -0.045  
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054)  
Text & Diverse Image -0.011 -0.011 0.018 -0.025  
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.053) (0.056)  
Text & Black Image -0.031 -0.032 -0.033 -0.043  
    (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055)  
Text & White Image -0.074 -0.048 -0.032 -0.063  
    (0.052) (0.050) (0.053) (0.054)  
      
Avg. Control Condition 2.54 2.55 2.53 2.55  
Observations 1,381 1,376 1,378 1,371  
R-squared 0.053 0.045 0.047 0.045  
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Table presents the results 
form separate regressions with the dependent variables corresponding to the column titles. Samples in 
panels A, B and C include only observations preferring for spending to be decreased, remain unchanged, 
or increased, respectively. Each regression includes controls for age, gender, race and ethnicity, 
educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status, 
employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** 




Table A28. Summary Statistics by Attention Check Response 
 Attention Check 
Variable  Failed Passed 
 Female 40 52 
 Hispanic 20 11 
 White 56 72 
 Black 21 12 
 Other 19 14 
 Bachelors or higher 32 34 
 Age   
    18-34 51 32 
    35-64 45 52 
    65+ 4 16 
 Household Income   
    $0-24,999 43 33 
    $25,000-74,999 36 46 
    $75,000 or more 21 21 
 Region   
    Northeast 20 20 
    Midwest 17 19 
    South 38 37 
    West 25 24 
 Democrat 43 37 
 Republican 37 38 
 Independent/other 20 25 
   
 Minutes 12.48 14.10 
   
 Observations 812 3066 
   


















Table A29. Preferences for Increased Spending, Alternative Samples 









VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: All Observations    
Text Only 0.073*** 0.048***  0.031 0.023 
 (0.025) (0.018)  (0.024) (0.017) 
Text & Diverse Image 0.089*** 0.069***  0.023 0.037** 
 (0.025) (0.017)  (0.025) (0.017) 
Text & Black Image 0.064*** 0.030*  0.016 -0.001 
    (0.024) (0.018)  (0.024) (0.017) 
Text & White Image 0.063** 0.041**  0.058** 0.024 
    (0.025) (0.018)  (0.025) (0.017) 
      
Observations 3,878 3,878  3,878 3,878 
R-squared 0.075 0.072  0.080 0.040 
      
Panel B: 5 ≤ Minutes ≤ 25    
Text Only 0.079*** 0.067***  0.033 0.041* 
 (0.030) (0.024)  (0.031) (0.022) 
Text & Diverse Image 0.067** 0.101***  0.010 0.062*** 
 (0.030) (0.023)  (0.031) (0.022) 
Text & Black Image 0.034 0.059**  -0.010 0.025 
    (0.030) (0.024)  (0.030) (0.023) 
Text & White Image 0.065** 0.071***  0.070** 0.036 
 (0.030) (0.024)  (0.031) (0.023) 
      
Observations 2,460 2,460  2,460 2,460 
R-squared 0.125 0.109  0.077 0.057 
Note: Table presents the results form separate regressions with the dependent variables corresponding to 
the column titles. In Panel A, the sample includes all observations, regardless of whether the attention 
check was passed, and each regression control for age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, 
and income.  In Panel B, the sample includes only those that spent at least 5 minutes and no more than 25 
minutes on the survey, and each regression includes controls for age, gender, race and ethnicity, 
educational attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status, 
employment status, and receipt of social assistance. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** 











Table A30. Manipulation Check 
 California J&J Komen Amazon NYC Walmart NFL 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Relative to Control condition      
Text Only 0.028 -0.010 0.034 -0.002 0.004 -0.032 0.011 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Text & Diverse Image 0.017 0.017 0.057** 0.025 -0.006 -0.005 0.014 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Text & Black Image 0.024 0.011 0.031 0.067** 0.040 0.014 0.030 
    (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Text & White Image 0.016 -0.036 0.052* 0.042 0.003 0.023 0.024 
    (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
        
Observations 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 
R-squared 0.063 0.014 0.026 0.059 0.036 0.041 0.042 
        
Panel B: Relative to Text & Image condition 
Text & Black Image 0.006 -0.007 -0.025 0.039 0.045 0.019 0.014 
    (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Text & White Image -0.000 -0.054* -0.006 0.015 0.007 0.027 0.010 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
        
Observations 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 
R-squared 0.072 0.021 0.030 0.067 0.035 0.048 0.045 
Note: Analytic sample includes all participants who passed the attention check. Table presents the results 
form separate regressions with the dependent variables corresponding to the column titles. In Panel B, the 
analytic sample includes observations in either the Text & Image, Text & Black Image, or Text & White 
Image conditions. Each regression includes controls for age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational 
attainment, income, political party, region, nativity, marital status, parental status, employment status, and 
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